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INTRODUCTION
In January 1996, twelve-year-old Craig Kielburger of Thornhill,
Ontario confronted Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien during
his trade mission in Asia on the subject of child labor. The meeting
made Kielburger a media celebrity and put child exploitation on the
1136 [13:1135
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Canadian government's agenda. 1 A few months later, the leader of a
tiny U.S. non-governmental organization ("NGO"). the National La-
bor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human
Rights in Central America, made allegations at a Congressional
hearing on labor abuses that Kathy Lee Gifford's clothing line for
Wal-Mart was manufactured by exploited underage workers in Hon-
duras.2 The ensuing brouhaha began with the television celebrity's
indignant denial of the accusations in a tearful public outburst and
led to her public crusade against the exploitation of children.
The issue of child labor has captured the attention of academics as
well. Although it appears to be an indisputable, universal concern, in
reality, it creates a minefield of controversies. These controversies
cut to the heart of the major issues in international relations today,
including, state sovereignty, economic development, international la-
bor rights, cultural sovereignty, poverty, racism, and inequality.
This paper addresses the issue of child labor by considering the
usefulness of public international law, particularly international hu-
man rights law, as one potential solution to the problem of child la-
bor. Specifically, it focuses on using the Inter-American system for
the protection of human fights as a tool in the fight against child la-
bor in Guatemala.
Guatemala provides a strong case study for the problem of child
labor in Latin America. It is a country with some of the worst socio-
economic indicators in the hemisphere and, despite a number of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental initiatives to deal with the problem,
child labor remains pervasive in many sectors of the economy. Gua-
temala has also ratified many international human rights instruments,
including instruments on labor rights and children's rights, and has
1. See PM Disappoints Child Ltbour Activist: Yitng Canadian DrMass Vaue
Commitmentfrom Chretien, GUARDIAN. Jan. 17. 1996. at At0; G. Fraser. School
No Problem for Youthful Child-Labour Fighter, GLOBE AND MAIL, May 2. 1P')96, at
A14.
2. See Steven Greenhouse. A Crusader M akes Celhbritte% Tremble, N Y.
T IES, June 18. 1996, at B4.
3. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, Kathie l'e and the Sweatshop Cruu le, L A.
TIMEs, June 14. 1996, at Al, Steven Greenhouse. Live With Kathie Lee and .Ap-
parel Workers, N.Y. Tu\,1ES. May 31. 1996. at B3: Susan Chandler & WendN Zell-
ner, Prime Time for Sweatshops. Bus. WK.. June 17. 1996. at 44.
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accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.
The Inter-American system is a strong forum for examining the
potential use of international human rights law in this area. The Inter-
American system is a well-developed regional human rights system
that has demonstrated a willingness to make broad judgments to en-
sure respect for human rights. Moreover, it has shown increasing
concern about economic, social, and cultural rights, while function-
ing in an under-developed region.
Part I of this paper discusses why child labor is a "problem" by ex-
amining three different aspects of the issue: what child labor is, why
we are concerned about it, and how it can be eradicated. Part II fo-
cuses on Guatemala, outlining the country's socio-economic condi-
tions and briefly outlining where child labor is found. Part III consid-
ers what has already been done in Guatemala to eliminate child labor.
Part IV discusses the potential role an international mechanism could
play and considers some of the alternatives to using the Inter-
American system. Part V addresses the Inter-American system, ex-
plaining what it is, what its advantages are, and how a child labor
petition might proceed. This section also outlines the international
human rights obligations that could be used to address child labor in
the American Convention on Human Rights,4 the American Declara-
tion on the Rights and Duties of Man, 5 and other international human
rights instruments ratified by Guatemala. Finally, Part VI examines
the limitations of using international litigation in general, and the In-
ter-American system in particular, as a tool in the fight against child
labor. The final section also includes a consideration of state respon-
sibility, the difficulty of litigating economic rights, and the need for
flexible remedies.
4. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 1 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinaf-
ter American Convention], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING To
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser. L/V/1I.7 I, doc. 6 rev.
I [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
5. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948,
O.A.S. res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States, Bogota, Columbia, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doe. 21 rev. 6
[hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 4,
at 17.
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I. WHY ARE WE CONCERNED ABOUT CHILD LABOR'?
A. WHAT IS CHILD LABOR'?
The International Labour Organization ("ILO") estimates that
there are at least 120 million children between the ages of five and
fourteen worldwide who work full-time; when combined with the
children for whom work is a secondary activity, the number jumps to
250 million. 6 About ninety-five percent of these children live and
work in developing countries.7 Asia accounts for more than fifty per-
cent of child workers, but Africa has the highest percentage of child
workers at one in three. 8 In Latin America, an estimated twelve per-
cent to twenty-six percent of children work." Statistics on the inci-
dence of child labor, however, are extremely unreliable. Many devel-
oping countries do not have accurate records of economic activity
and all states generally do not record illegal economic activity.'0
Measuring the extent of child labor is also difficult because there is
no generally accepted definition of "child labor."" I
The definition of "child" poses the first problem. Some cultures
view childhood biologically rather than chronologically 2 Thus, a
child may be deemed ready to take on the responsibilities of adult-
hood upon reaching a biological stage rather than reaching a particu-
lar numerical age. 13 In certain languages, there is no word for the pe-
riod between infancy and adulthood; the word for "child" means
6. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, CHILD LABOUR: TARGETING
THE INTOLERABLE 7 (1996) [hereinafter INTOLERABLE].
7. See BUREAU OF INT'L LAB. AFF.. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BY THE SWEAT AND
TOIL OF CHILDREN: THE USE OF CHILD LABOR IN AMERICAN IMPORTS 2 (1994)
[hereinafter ILAB 1994].
8. See id. at 10-11.
9. See ALEC FYFE, CHILD LABOUR 11 (1989) (citing ILO paper, U.N. seminar,
1985). According to ILO statistics compiled for 1995, the Latin American country
with the highest percentage of working children is Haiti at over 25 1, while about
16% of children in Brazil, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic are working. See
Economically Active Population, Estimates and Projections, 1950-2010, 16
WORLD OF WORK, June/July 1996, at 13.
10. See ILAB 1994, supra note 7, at 9.
11. See Olga Nieuwenhuys, The Children of the Rural Poor, in CHILDREN'S
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solely a kinship relationship. 14 Even accepting a chronological ap-
proach to age, not all cultures agree that childhood should last as
long as it does in the West. Developing countries frequently argue
that they lack the resources to keep children out of the workforce and
in school as long as in Western countries.'
5
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
("UNCRC") defines childhood as extending to the age of eighteen
unless domestic law provides otherwise.16 The ILO has also adopted
a chronological approach to defining childhood, but has tried to take
into account the realities of developing countries. In the Convention
Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment ("ILO
Convention No. 138"), 17 the minimum age of work must not be less
than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in any case,
cannot be less than fifteen years old.'8 The minimum age is eighteen
years old for work that is "likely to jeopardise the health, safety or
morals of young persons."' 9 In an effort to be sensitive to the needs
of developing countries, however, the Convention allows countries
whose economy and educational facilities are "insufficiently devel-
oped" to temporarily lower the basic age to fourteen. Similarly, the
minimum age for dangerous work can be reduced to sixteen "on con-
dition that the health, safety and morals of the young persons con-
cerned are fully protected and that the young persons have received
adequate specific instruction or vocational training in the relevant
branch of activity." 2 ' The Convention permits thirteen-year-olds to
perform light work that is not likely to be harmful to their health or
development, and that does not interfere with their education or
14. See id. at 24. Nieuwenhuys also notes that in some societies, girls are con-
sidered to have shorter childhoods than boys. See Alain Morice, The Exploitation
of Children in the Informal Sector: Proposals for Research, in CHILD WORK,
POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 136 (Gerry Rodgers & Guy Standing eds.,
1981).
15. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 73.
16. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/25, art. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter UNCRCI.
17. Convention Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,
June 26. 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297.
18. See id. art. 2(3).
19. Id. art. 3(1).
20. See id. art. 2(4).
21. Id. art. 3(3).
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training. Once again, developing countries can reduce this age by one
year.
22
Another definitional problem arises with the term -work." In the
West, it is common and generally encouraged for children at a rela-
tively young age to seek part-time employment delivering newspa-
pers or babysitting.23 In addition, a large number of children in all
societies do some form of unremunerated work within the family
unit.24 In traditional and semi-agrarian societies, this form of child
work is commonly viewed as "a rehearsal for adult life .... Given
the absence of or the limited opportunities for vocational training, it
performs an indispensable function in transmitting skills and in fa-
cilitating social adaptation." Work within the family unit may also
be considered to be a duty, an honor, or an expression of family soli-
darity.
26
Several scholars caution that it is dangerous to assume that work-
ing for one's family necessarily protects a child from the exploitation
commonly found in the paid labor force.- Nevertheless, whether
child work is within the family or the paid labor force, it is not al-
ways bad for the child or society:
[C]hild work can be a positive experience and. in the best circumstances.
children's work can prepare them for producti'e adult life ... Therefore,
children's work can be an integral part of family life and can contribute to
their healthy development. It can also build their confidence and self-
esteem, Child work can then be a painless and gradual initiation into adult
life.
28
Child labor, then, really refers to a certain subset of child work. In
1983, the Director-General of the ILO defined "child labor" as:
22. See id. arts. 7(1) & 7(4).
23. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 3-4 (discussing posti\e examples of childhood
work).
24. See id. at 14-15.
25. INT'L LABOUR CoNF.. 69th SEss., REPORT OF THE DIR.CTOR-GENER.M
CHILD LABOUR 15 (1983) [hereinafter CHILD LABOUR ExTRAcTI.
26. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 71 (citing representatives of Algeria, Bangla-
desh, Columbia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, and Syria at a United Nations seminar in
1985).
27. See id.: Nieuwenhuys, supra note 11. at 198.
28. FYFE, supra note 9, at 21.
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[Wiork that places too heavy a burden on the child; work that endangers
his safety, health or welfare; work that takes advantage of the defenseless-
ness of the child; work that exploits the child as a cheap substitute for
adult labour; work that uses the child's effort but does nothing for his de-
velopment; work that impedes the child's education and training and thus
prejudices his future.
2 9
In essence, child labor is work that is both harmful to a child's
physical, mental, or emotional development, and to the economic de-
velopment of society as a whole. 30 One of its defining characteristics
is exploitation-child laborers generally have no choice about
whether they work or under what conditions they work. 31 The intro-
duction to Peter Lee-Wright's book, Child Slaves, articulately sum-
marizes the difference between child work and child labor:
At about the age when most European children start full-time schooling,
hundreds of thousands of their contemporaries start a lifetime of drudgery
in the factories and fields of the Third World. By the hour at which the
average European adult climbs out of bed, thinking of the eight-hour day
ahead, many of those child labourers in the Third World will already have
put in several of their 12 to 16 daily hours. For them, there is no overtime
payment, no weekend off, no holiday and no future to speak of. These are
not children doing a part-time paper-route to earn pocket money before
going to school. They are the poor of the world; they work to save them-32
selves and their families from starvation, and their number is increasing.
B. WHAT IS HARMFUL ABOUT CHILD LABOR ?
The real problem in America is not child labor, but child idleness. You
cannot convince me that it hurts a child either physically or morally to
make him work. Where one child, in my experience, had been injured
from farm work, ten thousand have gone to the devil because of lack of
occupation.-Senator Charles S. Thomas (1925)
33
Senator Thomas's opinion on child labor was not an uncommon
sentiment in Western society in the nineteenth and early twentieth
29. Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, et al., The Exploitation of Child Labour: An In-
tractable Problem?, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 657, 659 (1994).
30. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the implications of child labor).
31. See id. at 18-19.
32. PETER LEE-WRIGHT, CHILD SLAVES 7 (1990).
33. RONALD B. TAYLOR, SWEATSHOPS IN THE SUN: CHILD LABOR ON THE
FARM I (1973) (quoting Senator Charles S. Thomas).
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centuries. 34 As the stories of Craig Kielburger and Kathy Lee Gifford
demonstrate, however, public opinion on child labor today is quite
different.35 An increasing amount of academic research and writing is
now considering the harmful effect of child labor. The types of harm
identified in the writing can be divided into four groups: physical
harm to the child, developmental harm to the child, exploitation of
the child's status and position, and harm to the general society.
1. Physical Harm
Concern about the physical effects of work on children focuses on
two different issues: children who work in inherently dangerous or
unhealthy occupations and work that impacts more harshly on chil-
dren than on adults doing the same job. The first issue is a moral
concern that human beings under a certain age should not have to
jeopardize their future development by working in a dangerous envi-
ronment. Dangerous occupations include military service, prostitu-
tion, mining, construction, industrial or agricultural work with dan-
gerous machinery or chemicals, and street work. s7
A growing body of literature suggests that children often have a
greater risk of injury or harm than adults in the same occupations. I
Children are more likely to suffer workplace accidents due to fatigue,
inattention, poor judgment, and insufficient knowledge of work proc-
esses. In addition, the machinery, tools, and layout of most work-
34. See SELECTED ARTICLES ON CHILD LABOUR 4 (Edna D. Bullock. ed., 1911)
(noting that people approved of the apprenticing of young children under Elizabe-
than poor laws and that fear of idleness in children was a product of the "Puntan
work ethic"). In the words of an 18th century educational reformer: "It %%as a dis-
grace to any Parish, to see the children of the Poor, who are old enough to do any
kind of work, running about the streets ragged and dirty." P.'MiELA HORN.
CHILDREN'S WORK AND WELFARE. 1780-1890, 9 (1994).
35. See INTOLERABLE, supra note 6. at 3 (noting that child labor is now; a con-
cern of both developing and industrialized countries).
36. See David C. Pitt, Child Labour and Health, in CHILD LXBOUR AND
HEALTH: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 10, 21 (Usha S. Naidu & Kamim R. Kapadia.
eds., 1985) (stating that "[tihere may be some benefits in regular food, clothing and
shelter, and medical attention, but this can hardly compensate for the dangers of
exposure to war or to the indoctrination into a violent philosophy that is part and
parcel of a military education").
37. See id. at 20-21; FYFE, supra note 9. at 21-24.
38. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 21-24.
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places are designed for adults. 39 When child workers do have acci-
dents, they also tend to be more serious than those of adult workers.1
For example, jobs that require children to carry heavy loads may lead
to deformation of the pelvis or the spinal column because the bones
of children are soft and not fully developed. 4'
Studies also show that child workers suffer more serious health ef-
fects from dangerous environmental conditions than adults.4 2 Ac-
cording to a 1984 study on occupational health in developing coun-
tries, children who perform agricultural work die of exposure to
pesticides more often than from the most common childhood dis-
eases put together.43 Children working near chemicals or radiation
also have a much higher incidence of disease than adults who work
in the same environment.44 Young workers are more susceptible to
hearing loss than adult workers and have a lower heat tolerance.
45
Environmental effects may be exacerbated because child workers are
usually given menial jobs involving greater exposure to solvents, al-
kalis, and toxic substances.
46
Child labor is also linked to poor health. Child laborers, in general,
are susceptible to communicable diseases due to malnutrition, ane-
47mia, hard labor, fatigue, and inadequate sleep. Malnutrition is a
48particularly serious problem. Although poverty rather than work
causes malnutrition, work increases nutritional needs that often can-
39. See COMBATING CHILD LABOUR 3 (Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden eds..
1988).
40. See INTOLERABLE, stpra note 6, at 8-9.
41. See Pitt, supra note 36, at 16; INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 8.
42. See COMBATING CHILD LABOUR, supra note 39, at 3 (citing WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CHILDREN AT WORK: SPECIAL HEALTH RISKS, Technical
Report Series 756 (1987)).
43. See INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 3 n.3 (citing J. Jeyaratnam, 1984 and
Occupational Health in Developing Countries, SCANDINAVIAN J. ON WORKING
ENVT & HEALTH, No. II, 1985).
44. See id. at 8-9; Pitt, supra note 36, at 18.
45. See INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 9.
46. See id. at 8.
47. See P.M. Shah, Specific Health Problems of Working Children: Alternative
Approaches for Health Care, in CHILD LABOUR AND HEALTH: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS, supra note 36, at 114-16 (discussing illnesses affecting working chil-
dren in Africa, Asia, and South America).
48. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 21.
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not be met.49 Child work and malnutrition can become key factors in
a vicious cycle. Malnutrition and anemia reduce productivity thus re-
quiring more time to accomplish the same task. Overexertion caused
by energy deficiency is most problematic in jobs where children are
expected to lift or carry loads that were intended for adults, such as
bales of hay or cartons.i
°
Poor nutrient intake can also halt the growth spurts that normally
occur in childhood.51 A study in Japan found a difference of four
centimeters in height between a group of children who had begun
working before the age of fourteen and a group who had begun
working after the age of eighteen. The two groups of children were of
comparable height at the age of twelve. 5- At a moderate level of
work, undernourished subjects were also found to require a signifi-




Even where child work is not physically dangerous, it is harmful
when it interferes with a child's opportunity to receive an education
or vocational training. Child work is particularly a problem when the
work itself is dull and repetitive and does not help the child develop
skills. Lack of education has serious consequences on a child's abil-
ity to improve his or her position in the labor market in later years.
The availability of compulsory, free education is essential, but it is
not enough in itself to guarantee an adequate level of schooling. In
many cases, the cost of books and uniforms and the opportunity cost
of taking a child out of the labor force prevent families from taking
advantage of free education. 4 In addition, in countries with high un-
employment and for many people who work in the informal econ-
49. See id.
50. See Pitt, supra note 36. at 16 (discussing the physiological effects of over-
loading on children whose bone structure is still soft).
51. See Shah, supra note 47. at 114-15 (discussing the effects of malnutriton
on children); see also FYFE. supra note 9. at 21 (noting the adverse effect of poor
nutrition and manual labor on growth spurts).
52. See Shah, supra note 47. at 115.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 113.
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omy, families may not consider formal education to be worthwhile.
55
Unaccommodating scheduling and unpractical curricula contribute to
this problem.
56
Work may interfere with education even when a child attends
classes. Evidence suggests that the education and development of
children who try to combine work with school can suffer considera-
bly if the work is fatiguing or if the hours do not leave enough time
for rest, recreation, and schoolwork.57 Statistics on enrollment also
do not reflect regularity of attendance, daily duration of studies, or
the interference of seasonal jobs with education.
58
Finally, certain jobs can also negatively impact a child's social or
emotional development. Developmental deficiencies are a general
concern where children start working at too young an age, particu-
larly where the work is outside of the family unit. Certain occupa-
tions such as street work, military service, and child prostitution are
also widely considered to have a negative effect on a child's social
development because children suffer "more devastating psychologi-
cal damage from living and working in an environment in which they
are denigrated or oppressed. ' 59
3. Exploitation
One of the unique characteristics of child labor is that the employ-
ers consider it a source of cheap labor and a means for quick prof-
its. 60 Child workers are often hired specifically because they can be
55. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 25 (noting that periods of high unemployment
augment labor divisions by providing an incentive for the rich to keep their chil-
dren in school). Poor children are less likely to be able to finish even their primary
education. See id.
56. See RICHARD ANKER & H. MELKAS, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES To ELIMINATE OR REDUCE CHILD LABOUR 9 (1996).
57. See CHILD LABOUR EXTRACT, supra note 25, at 17.
58. See Rodgers & Standing, The Economic Roles of Children: Issues for
Analvsis, in CHILD WORK, POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at
9 (analyzing school activity patterns and the difference between school enrollment
and school attendance).
59. INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 7.
60. BAL KRISHAN SHARMA & VISHWA MrTAR, CHILD LABOUR AND URBAN
INFORMAL SECTOR 9 (1990); see also B.M. DINESH, ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF
CHILDREN: DIMENSIONS, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 34 (1988) (noting that chil-
dren are paid less than adult laborers and have a less developed ego and sense of
status consciousness).
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paid less than adults. Employers reason that the decreased productiv-
ity of a child justifies the wage differential. Child workers, however,
are frequently paid significantly lower wages than adults when the
same amount of work is completed and workers are paid at a per
piece rate.
61
Wages are only one area in which child workers are exploited.
Employers often have other motivations for hiring children. They
may prefer to hire child workers because children are more likely to
be docile workers. 62 Children are also unlikely to know their rights or
to be able to exercise them. 63 This is particularly true of workers un-
der the age specified in domestic legislation because such workers
have no legal rights and usually cannot unionize.6 According to Be-
quele and Boyden: "Child labour is virtually synonymous with labour
without representation or rights."
65
Children are easy to exploit physically and sexually because of
their age and position in society.66 Abuse of girls who work as do-
67mestics or in export-processing factories is common.!' Child pros-




62. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 120 (stating that "'children make for an easily
disciplined labour force because of their subordinate position in society"); see (lso
DINESH, supra note 60, at 34 (noting that child workers are less afflicted by feel-
ings of guilt and shame than adult workers).
63. See COMBATING CHILD LABOUR, supra note 39, at 7 (explaining that em-
ployers exercise considerable power and control over underage workers).
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See Shah. supra note 47, at 116.
67. See id.; see also JAMES CHALLIS & DAVID ELLIMAN., CHILD WORKERS
TODAY 18 (1979) (noting that the use of Amer-Indian children in Central and South
America resembles chattel slavery); FYFE, supra note 9. at 15.
68. See KURT PETERSEN, THE MAQUiLADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEM_%tAL., 94
(1992) (discussing the rampant abuse of female employees by fellow workers and
management in Guatemala).
69. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing the increasing worldwide inci-
dence of child prostitution, child pornography, and the resultant sexually transmit-
ted diseases).
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4. Harm to Society
In addition to the harmful effects on the individual child, the wide-
spread use of child labor has damaging effects on the larger society.
The contribution of child labor to family income can be substantial
and necessary for individual households. 70 On the macro level, how-
ever, child employment is associated with higher levels of adult tin-
employment, greater inequality of income and wealth, and a decrease
in the overall wage rate for adults. One writer estimates that if all
the workers under the age of eighteen in India were removed from
the labor force, fifteen to twenty million unemployed adults would be
able to find jobs.72 In addition, children who have to work full-time
do not receive the necessary education or training to help them es-
cape poverty as they grow older. "Although children work because
they are victims of poverty, by working instead of being educated,
they tend to perpetuate the cycle of poverty."
73
In developing countries, the cost of raising children may be less
than the potential value of the child's labor to the family.74 In other
words, large families may be a form of investment. In the long term,
however, large families perpetuate the problem of poverty. As one
study of child labor concluded: "It is abundantly clear that depend-
ency on child labour recycles poverty and hopelessness by turning
today's generation of child labourers into tomorrow's sick, unem-
ployed, uneducated and unproductive adults who are tragic in their
own lives and a burdensome weight on their countries' hopes. 75
70. See SHARMA & MrTTAR, supra note 60, at 11.
71. See CHILD LABOUR EXTRACT, supra note 25, at 17; see also Rodgers &
Standing, supra note 58, at 37-38 (discussing poverty and socio-economic inequal-
ity).
72. See S.B. Dayal, Child Labour and the Nature of Occular Morbidities: Pre-
cipitar. Problems for Eve Health Care, in CHILD LABOUR AND HEALTII:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 36, at 129.
73. ILAB 1994, supra note 7, at 4.
74. See, e.g., FYFE, supra note 9, at 25 (discussing the perpetuation of the divi-
sion of labor along class lines).
75. PHARIS J. HARVEY & L. RIGGINS, TRADING AWAY THE FUTURE: CIllDI
LABOUR IN INDIA'S EXPORT INDUSTRIES at ii (1994).
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C. How CAN CHILD LABOR BE ERADICATED?
Child labor is unquestionably one of the most difficult issues con-
fronting national and international organizations, governments, and
academics, particularly because the number of child laborers has
continued to increase despite efforts to deal with the problem 76
Some critics advocate for the immediate abolition of child labor
through passage and enforcement of strict child labor and compul-
sory education legislation.77 Through education, developing countries
will draw much greater economic and social benefits in the long run.
Mandatory education would prevent countries from hiding a lack of
political will behind promises of progressive reform.7 8 Implicit in
this approach is an assumption that there is an international consen-
sus on the definition and inherent unjustness of child labor.
The more popular view is that legislation, although necessary, is
not sufficient to make a real impact on the problem of child labor."1
In the words of one academic: "It may be easier in the first phase, to
force employers to limit children's workdays and to provide adequate
lighting and safety equipment rather than to force them to forgo child
labour altogether." 81 The causes of child labor demonstrate why it
cannot be immediately abolished by legislation.
Child labor is a complex problem with many different causes. For
example, the increasing emphasis on the export market in many de-
veloping countries has increased the child labor problem as employ-
ers search for the cheapest, most docile workforce in order to stay
76. See ILO Puts Child Labour Fight on Front Bunter, in ILO W. sHINGION
FOCUS 10 (1995) (noting that the child labor problem has accelerated since the
1980s, particularly in Africa and Latin America).
77. See id. at 3 (discussing programs in Bangladesh and Thailand that focus on
moving children from the workplace to the classroom).
78. See INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that legislation encompassing
factors such as education evidences a clear evolution of public policy). Such policy
formation can be effective if accompanied by direct, practical action. See i.
79. See id. at 24 (stating that "worldwide anger about extreme forms of child
labour needs to be translated into a programme for international cooperation in the
field of economic and social policy").
80. See C. Grootaert & R. Kanbur, Child Labour: An Economic Perspectie,
134 INT'L LAB. REv. 187, 188 (1995): Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 29. at 672.
81. Grootaert & Kanbur, supra note 80, at 200.
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competitive.82 In some cultures, there is an element of social accept-
ability or tradition associated with child work.83 Even where educa-
tional facilities exist and families can afford to send their children to
school, some may choose to have their children work. 84 Female chil-
dren are more likely to work because education is regarded as less
relevant for them than for boys in many cultures. 85 Poor educational
facilities, illiteracy, racism, labor scarcity, family size, corruption,
and lack of willpower of government officials also contribute to the
problem.
The major cause of child labor, however, is poverty.86 Child labor-
ers work in order to survive. A study in India demonstrates that as the
number of working adults in the household increases, the proportion
of working children to working adults tends to decline, demonstrat-
ing the close relationship between economic necessity and child la-
bor.
87
The governments of countries where child labor is common also
generally lack the resources to enforce child labor laws or provide
adequate compulsory schooling. In addition, structural adjustment
programs mandated by the World Bank in recent years may have
been partly responsible for increasing child labor.89 A recent United
Nations report on child prostitution made the following comment:
"At times, the adjustment process fails to bear in mind sufficiently
82. See HARVEY & RIGGLNS, supra note 75, at ii; see also FYFE, supra note 9.
at 123.
83. See INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 12 (explaining that certain areas and
families have "a tradition of children following in their parents footsteps").
84. See id.
85. See Alejandro Cussianovich, Ser Pobre y Nino Hoy en Litino America, in
NINos TRABAJADORES: EXPERIENCIAS Y REFLEXIONES 12-13 (1988); DINESH, sit-
pra note 60, at 29.
86. See id. at 3 (noting that the majority of working children are located in the
developing economies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America); see also id. at 12 (stat-
ing that "poverty is the most important reason why children work").
87. See SHARMA & MrrTAR, supra note 60, at 125.
88. See id.
89. See Commission on Human Rights, Rights of the Child: Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography Report Submitted By Mr. Vitat Mili-
tarbhorn, Special Rapporteur In Accordance With Commission On Human Rights
Resolution 1193/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/84 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Reportl
(stating that "[m]any countries faced with the problem of the sale of children, child
prostitution, and child pornography are under pressure from international financial
agencies to adjust their economic programmes").
1150 113:1135
CHILD LABOR IN GUATEMALA
the needs of children and their families. Cutbacks in expenditure of-
ten have the greatest impact on the social services which affect the
well-being of children and their families." 90 This report noted that in
analyzing states' reports, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
had found that:
[C]hildren in both poor and rich countries have been victimized by
sweeping measures to curb inflation and encourage economic growth ....
This has caused new poverty. Groups of vulnerable children, in particular.
have been made to suffer: the girl child, the disabled, minority ethnic
groups, orphans, displaced and refugee children.91
The United Nations report on child prostitution noted:
Even in the poorest countries, there is often a tendency to spend too much
on arms purchases and too little on the development and protection of
children. In this perspective, the argument advanced by many countries to
explain the sale and trafficking of children on their territory, that they are
"due to poverty," is not totally convincing "2
There is much merit to this observation. Nonetheless, the major
cause of child labor is still the poverty of individual families and
.93-chlwokaagovernments. As such, "[a]ttempts at abolishing child work at a
stroke without compensatory improvements in income and welfare
provision would only leave poor families worse off." 4
Pursuing child labor through legislation also tends to focus on
children in the formal economy, ignoring the fact that a large number
of children work in the informal sector and in family-based subcon-
tracting enterprises that are notoriously difficult to monitor.95 Forcing
children out of the formal economy would increase child labor in
these sectors. "While it is reasonably easy to exclude children from
industry, it is far harder to oust them from the illegal workshops into
which they find their way instead."96 Furthermore, prohibitive legis-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 5.
93. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that "'liln developing countries the vast
majority of children continue to contribute to the family economy").
94. Id.
95. See BETRAYAL, A REPORT ON VIOLENCE TOWARD CHILDREN IN TODAY'S
WORLD 8 (C. Moorehead, ed. 1990).
96. Id.
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lation has the ironic consequence of making it more difficult to im-
prove the working conditions of children who continue to work since
these workers do not legally exist.
97
Even among those who agree that legislation alone is not the an-
swer, there are several theories on how to deal with child labor. Two
approaches do not focus directly on children. One view is that be-
cause child labor is largely a function of poverty, it will only disap-
pear with increasing economic development. Thus, development
should be pursued at all costs and human rights, including the elimi-
nation of child labor, will follow in due time.98 This view is com-
monly espoused by developing states as a justification for expanding
export-processing industries at the expense of basic labor rights. 99
While it is clear that the eradication of poverty is essential to the
eradication of child labor, it is not clear that economic development
is always directly related to this goal. For example, export-processing
industries, the modern trend in economic development, have been
criticized for providing few or no linkages with the domestic econ-
omy to spur long-term economic development and for generating lit-
tle wealth that remains in the developing country. 
00
Economic growth in some developing countries, in particular the
so-called "Asian tigers," has been successful in generally increasing
the wealth of the people. African and Latin American countries, on
the other hand, have not demonstrated this same upward economic
trend. This lack of economic growth may be partly attributable to un-
97. See, e.g., Grootaert & Kanbur, supra note 80, at 200; Rodgers & Standing,
supra note 58, at 39; LAMMY BETTEN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW: SELECTED
ISSUES 316 (1993).
98. See, e.g., S. ENKE, ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPMENT 181 (1963) (praising
the effects of a decrease in consumption and an expansion of the labor force on na-
tional growth and development); S.A. HEWLETT, THE CRUEL DILEMMAS OF
DEVELOPMENT: TWENTIETH CENTURY BRAZIL 4 (1980) (attempting to explain why
Brazilian development has required poverty and depression), both cited in Jack
Donnelly, Repression and Development: The Political ContingencY of Human
Rights Trade-Offs, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 305, 305-6 (David P.
Forsythe ed., 1989).
99. See Jose Luis Restrepo, Prospects for Arresting the Crisis, in THE CRISIS IN
LATIN AMERICA 25, 40 (Terrence McGrath ed.. 1987) (citing the Declaration of
Montevideo, which states: "Lack of growth in our region is the cause for serious
problems. It opens the door to instability and social tensions and it undermines the
consolidation of democratic processes.").
100. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 33-34.
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successful import substitution schemes adopted in the 1970s and
1980s; however, it has been suggested that weak government institu-
tions may be the biggest variable in determining the performance of
developing countries. 01 Thus, merely establishing export processing
factories in countries with corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies and
dysfunctional judicial systems may not ultimately result in the level
of economic development that is necessary to create improvements in
human rights. In any event, it will take decades before improvements
in human rights are visible. There is no reason why direct action to
fight child labor and other human rights violations should not take
place in the meantime.
Another view is that if labor rights in general were respected in
developing countries, child labor would disappear. 102 In other words,
if freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively were
routinely recognized, adult workers would be able to improve their
working conditions and wages. The improved conditions and wages
would result in the elimination of child workers because they are in
direct economic competition with adults. An increase in wages for
adults would also eliminate much of the need for children to work
since most children work to help the family unit survive. 0
3
There is merit to this view. Unfortunately, unions in developing
countries are generally weak and thus far have tended to be uncon-
cerned with child labor. Efforts to link trade unions at the interna-
tional level are only just beginning. In addition, this view assumes
that improved adult wages and working conditions in the formal
economy would provide sufficient economic incentive for most
families to send their children to school rather than work. Given the
causes of child labor, however, improvements to the education sys-
tem and changes in cultural attitudes may also be necessary. 1 ' Thus,
some form of direct action against child labor and general labor
rights violations is desirable.
101. See Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Counrie% Poor.': The Role ot
Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in THE LAW AND Et'oNOtIK' OF
DEVELOPMENT 15, 25-40 (Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds.. 1997).
102. Telephone Interview with Stephen Coats. Executive Director of the
U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project (Aug. 6 1996).
103. See id.
104. See FYFE. supra note 9. at 5-6 (noting that child work reflects social and
cultural patterns. as well as a response to economic forces).
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The view that some form of direct action is necessary in the fight
against child labor is the more popular stance. The ILO approach,
targeting the most abusive forms of child labor-including child
prostitution, bonded labor, hazardous working conditions, and em-
ployment of very young children-has received strong support. 105 In
fact, the ILO is now preparing a new child labor convention focusing
only on these very abusive types of child labor.106 The new conven-
tion aims to overcome the limited number of ratifications of ILO
Convention No. 138, the ILO's most current child labor conven-
tion. 107
Many people also now advocate helping working children attain a
greater voice. 10 8 In many cultures, childhood is viewed as a time of
innocence and dependency, a status that can be harmful in societies
where child labor is common. 10 9 The position of children has been
compared with that of women. Both groups are subject to exploita-
tion in wages and conditions because of their social status and their
need to work to survive. The difference, however, is that children are
a much broader, less homogeneous group without the capability of
being heard or of negotiating their demands. 10 As Fyfe notes, child
workers are in a paradoxical position. While they are exploited be-
cause of their social status, adult intervention to protect them per-
petuates this separate status."'
The idea of forming child worker associations has received in-
creased attention in recent years as a way of ensuring that children
themselves are part of the solution to child labor and that a balance is
struck between protection and the autonomy of children."1
2
105. See ILO, US Signs Pact to Fight Child Labour, in ILO WASH. Focus, su-
pra note 76, at 3; Global Plan on Child Labour Adopted, 30 UN CHRONICLE 54-55
(June 1993); ILAB 1994, supra note 7, at 5.
106. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 131-35 (discussing the low ratification rates and
the ILO's plans).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 5 (describing an approach where the focus is moved away from
protecting children and toward the development of their capacity for self-
determination).
109. See id. at 2-4.
110. See ROBERTO GUTIERREZ ARANGO, DRAMA Y TRAGEDIA DEL MENOR
TRABAJADOR 25 (1984); see also MARIA CRISTINA SALAZAR, NINOS Y JOVENES
TRABAJADORES: BUSCANDO UN FUTURO MEJOR 27 (1990).
111. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 171.
112. See id. at 7; SALAZAR, supra note 110, at 24.
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Movimiento de Adolescentes y Ninos Trabajadores. Hijos de Obre-
ros Christianos ("MANTHOC"), a loose association of local groups
of working children in Lima, Peru, is probably the most well-known
organization. Members of this organization meet regularly at the lo-
cal and national levels to discuss the problems they confront as
working children, to propose community development projects, and
to suggest measures for providing financial assistance to members. 113
A percentage of the members' earnings is contributed to a communal
fund to pay for activities.' 1 4 The group produces a newsletter and has
constructed its own building, which contains space for meetings, a
library, and an overnight refuge. 15 According to Boyden:
The need to cater specifically to working children in Lima is so great, and
the response so poor at present, that it is essential to build on programmes
whose priorities have been set by the children rather than by adults who
have little understanding of the childrens' needs and problems. This is
perhaps the only way to ensure that the provision is truly appropriate.116
There are no easy answers to the problem of child labor. As the
characteristics of child labor vary from country to country and from
community to community, many different types of solutions are
needed. Domestic policies and legislation, international pressure on
governments and corporations, and international commitment to
poverty alleviation are all essential to the solution.
This paper focuses on an approach that has not yet been tried-the
use of international litigation, specifically through the Inter-American
system. The paper does not intend to imply that this should be the
only approach to child labor, nor that it would be a good approach in
every situation. The goal is merely to assess the viability of this tech-
nique as another potential tool in the arsenal of weapons against ex-
ploitative child labor.
113. See Jo Boyden, Working Children in Lima. Peru, in PROTEC"rNG WORKING
CHILDREN 24, 43 (W. Myers ed., 1991).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 44.
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II. GUATEMALA AND CHILD LABOR
A. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN GUATEMALA
It must be apparent to the most casual observer that Guatemala pos-
sesses natural advantages which, if properly utilized, should make it pos-
sible for the Republic to achieve a relatively favourable position among
the nations of the Americas, both in living standards and in financial sta-
bility. ''7
Penned two years before the 1954 C.I.A.-backed coup, which top-
pled the leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz and plunged Guatemala into
forty years of military dictatorships, civil war, and economic insta-
bility, the words of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ("IBRD") report are laden with dramatic irony. The
economic potential of Guatemala viewed against the harsh reality of
its extreme economic and social conditions makes this country one of
the great tragedies of the Americas.
Located just south of Mexico, Guatemala is the largest country in
Central America, with a population of about ten million. 118 Between
forty percent and sixty percent of the people are indigenous descen-
dants of the Mayan peoples; the rest are known as ladinos.'19 Guate-
mala has the largest economy in Central America. In 1994, its gross
domestic product ("GDP") was US$12.9 billion, almost sixty percent
greater than that of El Salvador or Costa Rica, and more than seven
times greater than that of Nicaragua. 12 Despite its size and relative
wealth, however, Guatemala is characterized by an extremely Une-
qual distribution of wealth and land, and by serious racial and class
117. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV. (IBRD), Tili
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF GUATEMALA: REPORT OF A MISSION SPONSORED BY
THE IBRD IN COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA 3 (1952).
118. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1996, FROM PLAN TO
MARKET 188 (1996). The population figure tends to vary considerably in different
sources due to unreliable census information.
119. While the term ladino connotes a mixture of Indian and Spanish blood, in
fact, the distinction between ladinos and Indians is based more on lifestyle and
culture. Again, unreliable census data are responsible for the wide variation in the
proportion of the population reportedly composed of indigenous peoples.
120. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 118, at 210; see also T. BARRY, INSIDE
GUATEMALA: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO POLITICS, ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND
ENVIRONMENT 81 (1992).
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divisions. 12 1 Guatemala's GDP at US$1,200 per capita is one of the
lowest in all of Latin America. 122 While half a million peasants are
landless, two percent of the population own about sixty-five percent
of the arable land.
1 23
Traditionally, Guatemala has been almost exclusively an exporter
of primary products, particularly coffee, but also sugar, cotton, ba-
nanas, meat, and cardamom.' 24 Its status as a primary producer
makes Guatemala dependent on the world price of these commodi-
ties. Guatemala's primary producer status was also partially respon-
sible for the economic troubles experienced by it and other Latin
American countries during the 1980s. 1
2 5
High debtloads acquired during the 1970s to finance unsuccessful
import substitution schemes combined with a deterioration in the
terms of trade, including high international interest rates and a de-
creased influx of capital, led to the Latin American debt crisis of the
1261980s. - Despite its heavy debtload, Guatemala had been in a good
position to respond to growth opportunities in the early 1970s.1'
27
Floods in 1974, a major earthquake in 1976, and the oil crisis com-
bined to boost the rate of inflation to eighteen percent by 1976, al-
though GDP continued to grow through the late 1970s.12" Negative
economic growth, including negative output and a decline in real
wages, only occurred in the 1980s when the world price and demand
for coffee dropped sharply. 129 Internal political turmoil in Guatemala
contributed to the disastrous economic effects of the 1980s as the
121. See BARRY, supra note 120. at 81.
122. See THE WORLD BANK. supra note 118, at 188. Only Bohvia, Haiti, Hon-
duras, and Nicaragua have lower per capita GDP measurements. Set id.
123. See BARRY, supra note 120. at 102.
124. See THE WORLD BANK. supra note 118, at 188: BARRY. supra note 120, at
85, 105-7. The country's primary trading partner is the United States. Other signifi-
cant partners include Costa Rica, El Salvador. Germany. Italy, Japan, and Mexico.
About one-quarter of exports go to other Central American countries.
125. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 81.
126. See PETER CALVERT, GUATEMALA: A NATION IN TURMOIl 129-33 11985)
(discussing the economics of Guatemala's export indust i).
127. See id. at 128.
128. See id. at 129.
129. See BARRY, supra note 120. at 105-6 (discussing the drop in coffee prices
during the 1980s).
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government channeled a large proportion of the budget into military
spending and the United States terminated aid.
130
Throughout Latin America, the reality of the "lost decade" for the
average person was high unemployment, a decrease in the average
real wage, and cuts in social spending. 13 1 Guatemala was one of the
hardest hit countries, its per capital GDP falling 18.2 percent. 3 2 The
already highly inequitable distribution of wealth widened and the
overall poverty level increased dramatically. During this period, the
wealthiest ten percent of Guatemalans increased their percentage
share of wealth, while the average real wage fell thirty-five percent
and the real minimum wage fell almost fifty percent. 133 The World
Bank estimates that poverty increased from sixty-three percent in the
early 1980s to eighty-three percent in 1987, with extreme poverty in-
creasing from thirty-two percent to sixty-four percent.134 Rapidly in-
creasing population and increasing poverty were exacerbated by a
decrease in social spending during the 1980s, partly as a result of re-
quirements under structural adjustment programs imposed by finan-
cial institutions such as the World Bank. 1
35
Guatemala has experienced growth in its GDP since 1987, one of
the longest periods of growth in Latin America, although the average
rate of growth has not been very high. 136 The country has also suc-
ceeded in diversifying its economy. Since the 1980s, non-traditional
130. See id. at 107 (discussing the history and nature of United States military
aid to Guatemala).
131. See id. at 10; EL IMPACT DE LA CRISIS ECONOMICA EL AJUSTE Y LA
DEUDA EXTERNA SOBRE LA NINEZ EN AMERICAN LATINA (2d ed. 1993), for statis-
tics and personal anecdotes on the effect of the debt crisis on Latin American chil-
dren.
132. See Andres Bianchi, Crisis, Adjustment and Debt in Latin America: 1981-
1985, in THE CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 9. Along with Guate-
mala, the worst countries were Bolivia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Argentina, and
Uruguay.
133. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 97.
134. See id.
135. See U.N. Report, supra note 89, at 4; International Working Group on
Child Labour, I IWGCL NEWSLETrER at 8-9 (1995).
136. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 85. Only Chile and Columbia had a longer
period of positive growth in 12 years, although their growth rates are also higher.
See The Economic Experience of the Last 15 Years: Latin America and the Carib-
bean, U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean at 16,
U.N. Doc. LC/G.1925 (SES.26/17) (1996).
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exports have increased dramatically.' 37 These include non-traditional
agricultural exports such as strawberries and, more importantly,
manufactured goods such as apparel. 38 In 1991, for the first time, the
income from extra-regional exports of non-traditional goods sur-
passed that of coffee.
139
Despite modest growth, however, the majority of the population is
still worse off than it was in the 1970s.' 4° Haiti, the country with the
lowest life quality index in the Western Hemisphere, spends more on
education, has half the number of malnourished children, and the
same number of births attended by medical staff as does Guate-
mala. 14 1 The Guatemalan government agency, SEGEPLAN, esti-
mated in 1991 that eighty-nine percent of the population lives in
poverty; sixty-seven percent in extreme poverty. 142 High unemploy-
ment and underemployment also remain a problem. 14
3
B. CHILD LABOR IN GUATEMALA
The situation of most Guatemalan children is so serious that profound
and massive measures are needed to ensure their human rights, for the
sake of their physical safety, their legal guarantees, their education, fam-
ily, nutrition and physical, mental and moral growth.'"
Like most third world countries, Guatemala is very youthful; 46.5
percent of the population is under the age of fifteen and over half are
under the age of eighteen. 145 One study estimates that thirty-five per-
137. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 85.
138. See id. at 107-9.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 95 (discussing the increase in poverty levels since 1980).
141. See id. at 98.
142. See id. at 97.
143. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE GUATEMALA, DATOs BAsicos SOBRE Ls
CONDICIONES DE VIDA EN GUATEMALA 13 (1994) [hereinafter CENTRO DE
EsTuDIOs] (finding that by the end of 1991 the official unemployment rate was
53%).
144. Fourth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.LV/II.83, doc.16 rev. at 98 (1993) [hereinafter Fourth Report]
(concluding that given the enormity of the problems in Guatemala, the announced
solutions only represent a step in the right direction).
145. See CENTRO DE EsTUDIOs, supra note 143, at 2; COMISION PRO-
CONVENCION SOBRE Los DERECHOs DEL NINo (PRODEN) INFORME SOBRE LA%
SrrUATION DE Los DERECHOS DE Los NiNos, NiNAs Y ADOLESCFN'ES DE
GUATEMALA 1 (1995) [hereinafter PRODEN].
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cent of Guatemala's five million children start work at the age of six
years.1 6 The Comision Pro-Convencion Sobre Los Derechos del
Nino estimates that 1.5 million children must work to help their
families survive, 14 7 while the state statistics agency, the Instituto Na-
cional de Estadistica ("INE"), estimates that 1.16 million workers are
underage. 148 The government also estimates that twenty-six percent
of the economically active population are children. 149 The Committee
on the Rights of the Child noted that working children are not a new
phenomenon for any cultural group in Guatemala; however, it con-
cluded that never before has the presence of child labor been so per-
vasive or so dramatic a threat for the survival of the family.' 
50
The poor state of the education system in Guatemala contributes to
the child labor problem. Although the Constitution provides for
compulsory education for all children until the age of fourteen,' 5' in
reality, only fifty-eight percent of children between the ages of six
and eleven attended school in 1980 and this statistic increased only
nominally by 1990.152 Moreover, only thirteen percent of the popula-
tion over the age of fifteen has finished primary school, 153 less than
eight percent of the population goes on to secondary school, and only
two percent reach the university level. 154 Rural areas are the hardest
hit. "[I]n the rural areas the free public education to which all are in
theory entitled is not enforced, and those who have had schooling
146. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS, supra note 143, at 13.
147. See PRODEN, supra note 145, at 4.
148. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS, supra note 143, at 13.
149. See Comments of Ms. Caceres, Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Welfare.
Guatemala, in CHILD LABOUR: WHAT Is To BE DONE? REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INFORMAL TRIPARTITE MEETING AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL 50 (ILO.
June 12, 1996).
150. See Consideration of Reports of States Parties, Initial Report of Guate-
iala, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add. 33, Sess. No. 12, revised in U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SR.306-308, SR.306 at 25 (1996) [hereinafter UNCRC Consideration I.
151. See CONSTITUCION POLrICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA (Decreto-
Ley Numero 46-85/47-85, 1985), art. 74.
152. See Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 6 (finding that in the last ten years
figures on the net and gross rates of primary education have remained virtually un-
changed).
153. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS, supra note 143, at 8. The average number of
grades completed in the United States is nine. In most Latin American countries it
is five. In Guatemala, however, it is only 1.7. See id.
154. See id.
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have seldom had more than two years at most."' 1 Education has also
been negatively affected by militarization, not only because public
funds were channeled into counter-insurgency programs during the
civil war, but also because teachers were a frequent target of political
killings and disappearances. 156
In 1991, government spending on education was only 1.2 percent
of GNP-the lowest in Latin America.' 57 By 1996, this figure in-
creased to 1.9 percent.'58 UNICEF estimates that there is one active
teacher for every 400 Guatemalan children. There is a deficit of
30,000 to 50,000 teaching positions with only 500 to 1,000 positions
created annually.159 Furthermore, only five percent of schools have
bilingual education in Mayan languagesI6U even though over one-
half of the population is indigenous.'(" The result has been one of the
highest illiteracy rates in the region. The average illiteracy rate is
fifty-two percent, but in rural areas and among indigenous peoples, it
reaches as high as eighty-five percent for women. "'2 This rate is in-
creasing at a rate of 1.3 percent per year. c '  The illiteracy rate of chil-
dren under the age of fifteen is the second highest in the region after
155. CALVERT, supra note 126, at 30 (describing the disparity in the literacy rate
between the Indian community and the rest of Guatemalan society).
156. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS. supra note 143. at 10.
157. See 40 U.N. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 74 (1995); CENTRO ESTCDIOS, _ upra
note 143, at 9 (stating that spending on education is between 1.514 and 1.7(1 of
GDP and noting that UNESCO recommends that 7c of GDP be spent on educa-
tion).
158. See UNCRC Consideration. sq)ra note 150, at 8.
159. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS. supra note 143, at .) (estimating that there is
deficit of 30,000 positions with 1.000 new positions created each year); PRO-
JUSTICE AND PEACE COMMrI"EE OF GUATEMAL. HUMAN RIGHTS IN Gt .%TI X\, ,:
1992, 59 (1992). There is a deficit of 50.000 jobs with 5,000 ne%% jobs announced
annually. Only 500 jobs. however. are actually created. See id.
160. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS. supra note 143. at 9.
161. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE. GUATEMALA CO.'NTRY Ri:I'ORT ON Hi SIAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996 (1997) (stating that although more than half of the
population is comprised of indigenous people, they remain largely outside of Gua-
temala's economic and social mainstream). The Report found that many' rural in-
digenous people are illiterate and do not speak Spanish. See tiL As a result, these
people have very limited educational opportunities. resulting in fewer employment
opportunities. See id.
162. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR HUMAxN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1993, 459 (1994) [hereinafter DOS COUNTRY REPORTS]; CENTRO
DE ESTUDIOS, supra note 143, at 8.
163. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS, supra note 143. at 8.
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Haiti. 164 Because of the extreme poverty, high birth rate, and under-
funded and underdeveloped education system, child labor is preva-
lent in many different sectors of the Guatemalan economy.
1. Agriculture
In terms of soil and climate conditions, few countries are better
equipped than Guatemala for agricultural development. The varied
regional conditions provide a place for almost every type of agricul-
ture known in the Western Hemisphere. As such, agriculture ac-
counts for approximately twenty-five percent of Guatemala's GDP,
employs half the workforce, and comprises two-thirds of its export
income. 165 In comparison, only Bolivia and Haiti have such a high
proportion of the population employed in agriculture. Agriculture's
share of total employment, however, has been falling since the 1950s.
Guatemala has traditionally concentrated on the production of ba-
nanas, cardamom, coffee, and sugar. 166 Other agricultural products
include beans, cacao, chicle, cotton, hemp, rice, tobacco, and
wheat. 167 Guatemala also has extensive forest resources. 168
The U.S. Department of Labor estimates that about one-third of
the seasonal agricultural workers migrating to the southern coast each
year are children.169 Children, generally between the ages of twelve
and fourteen, do the same work as adults but are paid half the
wages. On sugar cane plantations, children reportedly help their
164. See Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 6 (noting that in 1990, 45 out of
every 100 adults could not read or write).
165. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1996 COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECONOMIC
POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES (1997) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT] (detailing
Guatemala's income, production, and employment rates from 1994 through 1996).
166. See id.
167. See CALVERT, supra note 126, at 129 (discussing the various agricultural
crops produced in Guatemala).
168. See Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 9 (finding that Guatemala is losing
153,000 hectares of forest land each year).
169. See BUREAU OF INT'L LAB. AFF., DEP'T OF LAB., BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL
OF CHILDREN II: THE USE OF CHILD LABOR IN U.S. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS AND
FORCED AND BONDED CHILD LABOR 62 (1995) [hereinafter ILAB 19951 (finding
that over 300,000 people in Guatemala migrate to the southern coast to work on
coffee, cardamom, cotton plantations, and sugar cane).
170. See id. at 62 (citing U.N. Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, Rights of Children in Guatemala, Submission of
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parents by cutting or trimming the cane with machetes and picking
up loose stalks that fall off loaders and trucks. 17' According to
Commission reports on the use of child labor, this seasonal migration
has a profound impact on the life and development of thousands of
Guatemalan children. They are impeded from attending school and
many abandon their studies completely. Even more troubling, by the
age of ten, many children become sick or die from the inhumane
conditions under which they are forced to live and work while
working on the coast.
172
It is difficult to quantify the number of children working in the
coffee industry, which is found in almost every province in Guate-
mala. One study estimates that ninety to ninety-five percent of the
children who work in coffee-producing communities are working in
the coffee industry. 173 A 1990 report found that men were being fired
and replaced by women and children because the latter were cheaper
to employ. 174 When children are old enough to reach the lower tree
branches, they begin helping their parents during the harvest by
picking and sorting beans, carrying sacks of coffee, and sometimes
handling fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides without proper safety
equipment. 175 These children work from eight to twelve hours per
day, often without legally required benefits. 176 They also run the risk
of insect bites and stings, frequent accidents from machetes and other
tools, and wounds from coffee branches. Other medical infirmities
include intoxication from exposure to herbicides, rheumatic fever,
and respiratory problems from the climatic conditions.
177
the International Federation of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.21199/
NGO/15, at 3 (1995)).
171. See id. at 74.
172. See PRODEN, supra note 145, at 3. The Committee on the Rights of the
Child also commented on the situation of migrant children in its consideration of
Guatemala's report in 1996. See UNCRC Consideration, supra note 150, at 7, para.
34.
173. See M.E. VILLAREAL & C. PERALTA CHAPERON, MENORES TRABAJADORES
EN ALTO RIEsGo, TOMO I: SECTORES PRODucTIvos DE LA CAL Y EL CAFE 35
(1995) [hereinafter PAMI TOMO I]
174. See ILAB 1995, supra note 169, at 66 (describing the employment condi-
tions on coffee plantations in Guatemala).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 65; cf. INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 8 (describing the most
common situations in which child workers encounter occupational hazards).
177. See PAMI TOMO I, supra note 173, at 47.
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While many children do go to school, their attendance is often ir-
regular as a result of the four to five month period when work re-
quirements make school attendance unlikely. 178 A Department of La-
bor study noted that full-time employment of children in Guatemala's
coffee industry is declining on the larger plantations where schools,
and sometimes even daycares, are being established. 179 These planta-
tions, however, are often heavily pressured by parents to allow child
labor, likely due to both financial and cultural reasons. 180 Community
leaders, interviewed in one study, who thought that eliminating child
labor was impossible without first eliminating the poverty, exploita-
tion, and lack of protection associated with rural workers. 8' Teach-
ers who were interviewed thought the best approach was not to pro-
hibit child labor but rather to improve the conditions of work and
protect the physical integrity of workers. They also suggested that, to
end exploitation, employers pay an adequate salary and ensure that
the maximum allowed hours of work are enforced.182
2. Industry
Although fewer children work in industry than in agriculture, child
labor in the industry sector tends to receive greater attention from the
international community. This focus on industry is due to the sector's
greater visibility and the greater ease of legislating against labor vio-
lations in this area. The industries that attract this greater attention
include export-processing factories, construction, the lime industry,
fireworks factories, and mining.
Export-processing factories: Known as maquiladoras or maquilas,
export-processing factories emerged as an economic force in the
1980s. Support from the Guatemalan government, aid from the
United States, and duty-free exemptions under U.S. trade legislation
contributed to this emergence. In 1986, there were twenty maquilas
178. See id.at4l.
179. See id. at 21.
180. See ILAB 1995, supra note 169, at 4 (discussing parents' negative attitudes
toward schooling). According to the Department of Labor Report, many parents
feel that children's experience working on farms is more useful than formal class-
room training. See id.
181. See PAMI TOMO I, supra note 173, at 59.
182. See ILAB 1995, supra note 169, at 59.
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with 4,000 workers. 183 By 1991, there were 225 assembly plants with
50,000 workers.1 84 By 1993, maquilas were the fourth largest gen-
erator of foreign exchange in the country. 8 5 Presently. the largest
single investor is South Korea, although ninety percent of the prod-
ucts are shipped to the United States.' 86 Approximately ninety per-
cent of these export-processing factories are garment assembly
plants. 187 While the majority of the factories are located in Guate-
mala City, some exist in smaller towns, in particular. Quetzaltenango
and Chimaltenango. 188 In these towns, the factories subcontract to
families and small businesses in order to retain cheaper labor costs.
This practice has led to an increasing cottage industry in small towns.
The businesses are known as maquilas de hornigas or ant facto-
ries.
1 89
Women constitute the majority of the workforce in the maqui-
las.190 About forty percent of the workers are under the age of eight-
een.191 Labor organizer, Flor de Maria Salguero de Laparro, testified
before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Labor-Management Rela-
tions that child workers as young as eleven or twelve are not un-
common in the maquilas.192 Although the percentage of working
girls under the age of fourteen is reportedly declining in Guatemala
City, factories located outside the capital and subcontracting enter-
prises are more likely to continue to employ young children. '
183. See INTER-CHURCH COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMIRICA_.
CRISIS OF STATE-STATE OF CRISIS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN GL'ATFMAl 16 11995)
[hereinafter ICCHRLA].
184. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 113 (discussing the growsth of imaquilas.
185. See ICCHRLA, supra note 183, at 16 (discussing the role of maquilas in
the foreign markets).
186. See id.




190. See ICCHRLA, supra note 183. at 16 (noting the role of women in maqui-
las); see also PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 41 (noting that women constitute 75', to
80% of the workforce in Guatemala City but only 50% in rural areas I.
191. See ICCHRLA, supra note 183, at 16 (detailing the ages of workers in ma-
quilas).
192. See id. at 68.
193. See ILAB 1994, supra note 7. at 68 (noting the continued employment of
young children by factories in small towns).
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Work in the maquilas is not inherently dangerous. Wages, how-
ever, are generally below subsistence level and working conditions
are abysmal. According to the Inter-Church Committee for Human
Rights in Latin America, employees report working nearly eleven
hours per day, six days per week, for half of what is necessary for ba-
sic subsistence. 194 Locking employees in the factory overnight to en-
sure a shipment is finished on time is a common practice. 195 Moreo-
ver, physical and sexual abuse is reportedly rampant, though rarely
reported to the Ministry of Labor. 196 Women are usually fired if they
become pregnant.'
9 7
The Pan-American Health Organization reported in 1993 that
work in Guatemalan assembly plants was "performed in inadequate
health conditions."' 98 Factories are located in warehouses that "lack
proper lighting, ventilation, and washroom facilities."' 199 The tem-
peratures in the factories range from freezing in the early morning
hours to extremely hot during mid-day.20 Additionally, only a few
factories have fans on the shop floor. Factories generally have only
two doors that are kept locked during the day despite the high inci-
dence of earthquakes in the region.
202
Construction: Construction is one of the most dynamic sectors of
the Guatemalan economy. Children rarely work on large-scale con-
struction projects that pay the legally guaranteed minimum wage and
benefits. They are more likely to work in rural areas on small-scale
20projects. 03 Children of eight to ten years of age are called appren-
tices. They generally combine school and work, accompanying their
194. See ICCHRLA, supra note 183, at 16 (explaining the working conditions in
the factories).
195. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 89; see also Fourth Report, supra note
144, at 88 (describing abusive employment practices in the maquilas).
196. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 94.
197. See ICCHRLA, supra note 183, at 17 (noting that pregnant women are fired
so owners can avoid paying maternity leave benefits).
198. Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 113 (discussing findings made by the
Pan-American Health Organization).
199. ICCHRLA, supra note 183, at 17.
200. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 70.
201. See id. at 71 (noting the lack of proper ventilation in the maquilas).
202. See id. at 73.
203. See M.E. VRLLAREAL & C. PERALTA CHAPETON, MENORES TRABAJADORES
EN ALTO RIESGO. ToMo II: SECTORES PRODucrIvos DE LAS CONSTRUCCION Y
COHETERIA 13-17 (1995) [hereinafter PAMI TOMO II.
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fathers to the construction sites in their free time to do odd jobs such
as transporting, digging, and cleaning. As a result, they are com-
pletely dependent upon their fathers for any monetary compensation.
Children over the age of ten are called assistants. These children
typically engage in dangerous work such as bricklaying.
The risk and danger these children are exposed to is immense.
Electrocution, the third most common accident among construction
workers, is the result of poorly trained workers. Additionally, perti-
nent information, such as where cables are laid, is frequently not pro-
vided to the workers. Other risks include falling from buildings and
scaffolding, falling into unmarked holes, and suffering injuries from
tools and materials such as lime. Children are also often used in the
construction of shafts where falls, asphyxia, and earthquakes are
great risks. According to one teacher:
el trabajo de ayudante de albanil esta definitavemente prohibido para estos
menores por dos razones fundamentales: Primero, porque es un trabajo
peligroso y pesado para un menor de edad y. segundo, porque el constante
contacto de menores con personas que no estan calificadas, cultural ni




Lime: Lime is a white powder used in the production of cement
and mortar. It is also commonly used as a fertilizer. In Guatemala,
lime is produced in marginal areas characterized by poor education
and health facilities. Children begin working at lime production fa-
cilities at the age of six or seven. They have no legal rights and are
dependent on their fathers for money. Both boys and girls often work
alongside their parents performing such tasks as transporting wood
and stone, tending ovens, and filling sacks with lime. When inter-
viewed during a study, one 16-year-old worker commented: "Este es
el trabajo mas duro que existe; jamas desearla que mis hijos se dedi-
caron a el. ' 2 °5
204. Id. at 30. Translation: The work as a construction worker assistant is defi-
nitely prohibited for these minors for two fundamental reasons: First, because it is a
dangerous job and very strenuous work for a minor and, second, because the con-
stant contact of minors with culturally and morally unqualified people exposes
them to degrading practices.
205. PAMI TOMO I, supra note 173, at 25. Translation: This is the hardest work
that exists; I would never want my children to do it.
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Risks at these lime facilities include cave-ins, injuries from carry-
ing heavy loads, and significant health problems. Common health
problems include hair loss, intoxication from inhalation of lime, seri-
ous skin problems, injuries on the hands from contact with lime, ir-
ritation of the eyes, nasal hemorrhages, and conjunctivitis.20
6
Schooling for children is a low priority, not only because it interferes
with work but also because it is perceived to be useless. Most work-
ing children only reach the third grade. Moreover, there is a high rate
of absenteeism, repeat years, and permanent dropouts.
207
Fireworks production: The presence of child labor in this sector of
the Guatemalan economy is extremely disturbing. Cohetes are small
firecrackers that sound like firing guns when they explode. They are
a popular expression of happiness for people of all ages and cultures
in Guatemala, as well as a central part of most fiestas. They are,
however, highly explosive, toxic, and flammable. Most risks are as-
sociated with their production and include loss of vision or hearing,
amputation, and even death. Large-scale employers prefer to hire
young children because of the agility of their hands. Most children
working in this industry, however, work in small family operations.
Families involved in the production of cohetes are usually poor and
live in substandard housing with no electricity or water. One study of
this industry found that the majority of children in grades one to three
combined work and school, but only ten percent of the students in
grade six were not working.
20 8
Mining: Finally, Latin American mines, particularly small-scale
mines in remote areas, employ children in all aspects of production.
Children are hired to extract, transport or separate ore, or dig tun-
nels.209 Often the children are used to dig tunnels or mine spaces that
are too small for adults. 210 Hazards include exposure to harmful par-
ticles, gases, and fumes that can cause respiratory diseases greatly in-
crease the risk of silicosis, pulmonary fibrosis, asbestosis, and em-
physema. 2 1 Physical strain, fatigue, musculoskeletal disorders, and
206. See id. at 8.
207. See id. at 10.
208. See PAMI TOMO II, supra note 203, at 43.
209. See ILAB 1994, supra note 7, at 7.
210. See id.
211. See INTOLERABLE, supra note 6, at 13.
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injuries from falling objects are also risks. -t2 Guatemala has a sig-
nificant mining industry, including copper, nickel, silver, and zinc re-
sources. 213 Information is not available on the extent to which child
labor is found in Guatemalan mines.
3. Informal Sector
Street children are an enormous and growing problem in Latin
America. These children are pushed to the streets by extreme pov-
erty, a high birth rate, inequitable land distribution, government and
military repression, urbanization, family disintegration, and lack of
education and work opportunities. 2 14 Street children are a particular
problem in Guatemala, which has the second highest number of poor
and indigent children in Latin America after Peru.215 The United
States House of Representatives estimates that 5,000 children live on
the streets of Guatemala City and another 1.4 million work there.
2 1b
Childhope USA estimates that this number will double by the year
2010.217
The average age of street children in Guatemala City is 11.6
years. 218 Girls are younger on average than boys.2 19 Younger children
usually beg for money.22 Older boys collect bus fares, shine shoes,
perform, or steal.22' Girls are usually prostitutes, although a few do
cleaning or odd jobs.2 2 Casa Alianza, an organization that works
with street children in Guatemala City, estimates that most street
212. See id.
213. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 95.
214. See FYFE, supra note 9. at 3 (noting that Latin American has the highest in-
cidence of children working in the informal sector).
215. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS, supra note 143, at 3 (providing data about the
number of poor and indigent children in Guatemala).
216. See T. Rice Lave, Breaking the Cycle of Despair: Street Children in Gua-
temala City, 27 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 57. 59 (1995) (discussing the 1991
U.S. House of Representatives Fact Sheet concerning street children around the
world).
217. See id. (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional Director. Childhope USA).
218. See id. (citing El Drama de los Ninos de la Calle, SiIo VEI\NTUNo. July 24.
1993, at 2).
219. See id. at 59-60.
220. See id.
221. See Lave, supra note 216. at 59-60.
222. See id.
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children eat less than one meal per day.223 Health problems include
skin, dental, gastro-intestinal and respiratory problems, trauma, and
sexually transmitted diseases. 224 In addition, street children con-
stantly face the threat of violence at the hands of both non-state and
state agents, including the police and the army.
5
Researchers have conducted studies of street children in Brazil,
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru. 226 These studies found that more boys
227than girls tend to be on the streets. Girls usually end up in domes-
tic service instead-the lowest paying job with the longest hours.
The majority of street children still have contact with their families
and claim to attend school, though attendance is usually infrequent.
Most want to work, but few have high ambitions. Fear of violence
and the need for emotional support are rated as their largest con-
CeTS228
cerns.28
According to Carlos Palacio, Program Director for Childhope in
Guatemala City, it is not money itself that is the real key to child
street labor but the lack of meaningful employment opportunities for
adults. Palacios states: "Only if the families have the opportunities to
have work will [there] be the possibility for the kids to go back to
school .... If you don't give any support to the families it will be




225. See id. at 66; see also U.N. Report, supra note 89, at 22 (noting the threats
of violence facing street children).
226. See W. E. Myers, Urban Working Children: A Comparison of Four Sur-
veys from South America, 128 INT'L LAB. REv. 321 (1989) (comparing the fol-
lowing surveys: B. Espinola et al., En La Calle: Menores Trabajadores De Las
Calle En Asuncion (1987); Z. Andrade Goncalves: Modo De Vida E Representa-
coes De Meninos De Rua (1985); M. Chej de Penaloza, Situation Del Menor En
Alto Riesgo En La Ciudad De Cochambamba (1987); W. Alarcon Glasinovich,
Pobreza Urbana y Trabajo Infantil En Lima Metropolitana (1986)).
227. See id. at 325.
228. See Myers, supra note 226, at 333-34.
229. Telephone Interview with Carlos Palacios, Program Director for Childhope
in Guatemala City (August 22, 1996).
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4. Domestic Sen,ice
Domestic workers are "the invisible child laborers.'" u There is
little statistical data pertaining to the actual numbers and working
conditions of these workers, who tend to be young women and
girls.231 Several articles and reports, however, note the long hours,
low pay, and extreme vulnerability of these workers to all forms of
abuse. 232 Domestic workers usually work six or seven days per week
for room and board and occasionally a little pocket money.233 Most
domestic workers are completely isolated, having no oportunity to
meet other domestics or learn their employment rights.- Employers
bring young workers from rural areas to work in the city. Because the
children do not know anyone and are unfamiliar with a city environ-
ment, they are extremely vulnerable to abuse.
235
Fyfe comments that in Latin America, "[t]he employing family
may rationalize virtual imprisonment in the home as caring for the
girl's morals, but traditionally, they are available to the sons of the
family. If they become pregnant, however, they will be turned out,
forcing many of them into prostitution to care for their illegitimate
children. 236 Once a domestic worker has a child, securing work in a
home is practically impossible.
2 37
230. ILAB 1995, supra note 169, at 144.
231. See Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Report of the Sec-
retary General, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/52/523 (1997) (stating that the extent of
child labor is difficult to determine because statistics are not easily accessible).
232. See, e.g., ILAB 1995, supra note 169, at 144 (stating that although there
has been little recent written documentation of child labor, incident reports con-
tinue); Myers, supra note 226, at 327-8, U.N. Report, supra note 89, at 22 (taking
note of several important reports on the labor situation in Central America): Boy-
den, supra note 113, at 40-41.
233. See generally Boyden, supra note 113. at 40 (commenting on the condi-
tions that young domestic workers endure).
234. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 115 (attributing the lack of social opportunity to
isolated conditions brought on by unreasonable labor demands).
235. See id. at 115 (describing instances in which young rural children are en-
trusted to a fictitious family member and subsequently subjected to ill treatment in
urban labor situations).
236. Id. at 115.
237. See Boyden, supra note 113, at 40 (discussing the lack of employment op-
portunities available to young women with babies).
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5. Military Service
Military service by minors under the age of fifteen is contrary to
both the Convention on the Rights of the Child 238 and the 1977 Pro-
tocols to the Geneva Conventions. 239 Although Guatemala has pro-
hibited forced military recruitment of all ages since 1995,
MINUGUA, the United Nations mission in Guatemala, found cases
of participation of minors under the age of fifteen in both army and
guerilla units, as well as in the army-organized civil defense pa-
trols. 240 Guatemala's Human Rights Procurador estimates that the
military forced 400 youths under the age of eighteen into military
service between 1991 and 1994, 24 1 even though the worst of the long
civil war was over. In its 1994 report, the Inter-American Commis-
sion found that Guatemala had not taken steps to stop forced military
recruitment of all ages. 242 The Commission further found that mili-
tary recruitment was discriminatory, selectively choosing poor farm-
ers, students, or the mentally retarded.243
6. Child Work in the Home
Children in all cultures perform some amount of work in the
home. In Latin America, however, many children, particularly girls,
work full-time in the home cooking, cleaning, and caring for younger
siblings, enabling the adults in the household to work outside the
238. UNCRC, supra note 16, art. 38.
239. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12.
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 77 (Protocol I), Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, art. 4(3c) (Pro-
tocol II) (stating that as a guarantee of humane treatment, children under the age of
15 cannot be recruited for or partake in military action).
240. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996: GUATEMALA 93, 95
(1996).
241. See PRODEN, supra note 145, at 11 (stating that youths are presently
forced to participate in military action).
242. See Stephen J. Schnalby, The Santiago Commitment As a Call To Democ-
racy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala,
25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393, 480 (stating that Guatemala failed to disband
the military following a recommendation to do so by the Inter-American Commis-
sion).
243. See Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 48-49 (criticizing discriminatory re-
cruiting actions of the Guatemalan military).
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home. 244 Although some consider this work as less exploitative than
working outside the family, at the very least, full-ime work in the
home still interferes with a child's education. 245 Furthermore, chil-
dren who work in the home may be more prone to exploitation as
they completely rely on their parents for any form of support.
Perhaps of greater concern is the large and growing number of
family-based sub-contracting enterprises. As noted above, this form
of enterprise is common in the production of fireworks and in the ex-
port-processing industry. In the garment maquilas, labor costs are
up to twenty-five percent cheaper when sub-contracted to family
businesses, making this a popular arrangement with companies.
247
The whole family must work together in these small businesses in
order to make enough to survive. 248 Unfortunately, the labor inspec-
tion system in Guatemala can not adequately monitor even the large
factories, much less the many small, family-based businesses that
exist across the country.
249
7. Child Labor and the Female Child
On the streets, in the military, and in most areas of the formal
sector, child workers are predominantly male. Only in domestic
service, prostitution, and in the maquiladoras do female child work-
ers predominate. 250 Girls are also more likely to perform unremuner-
ated work in the home.2 5 PRODEN suggests that girls are particu-
244. See PETERSEN, supra note 68. at 92 (citing data revealing that in Guatemala
21% of children between twelve and fourteen are working in order to contribute to
family income).
245. See FYFE, supra note 9, at 157 (citing statistics that reeal a stead), increase
in the total number of female children who do not attend school in man), less de-
veloped countries).
246. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
247. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 114 (comparing the cost of labor within the
cottage industries of the maquilas to the cost of labor in large factories in Guate-
mala city).
248. See id. at 114 (stating that rural families who formerly engaged in tradi-
tional weaving are now involved in the garment assembly and sewing operations of
the maquilas).
249. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 66 (commenting on the inadequate inspec-
tion system in Guatemala).
250. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 113 (stating that maquih ors employ
mostly young women).
251. See id. at 166.
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larly affected by the continuance of child labor since they are the first
to be removed from school in the short term.252 This leads to lower
education levels for women and, in turn, fewer employment opportu-
253nities. Also, low education levels tend to exacerbate high birth
rates and high infant mortality. 254 Commentators agree that girls are
the first to lose out on education both because they are needed to help
with domestic work and because they are less valued than boys.
255
The UNCRC commented that "ill-treatment of children appeared
to be endemic in Guatemala, where the notion seemed to persist that
they were not autonomous individuals, but the property of the fam-
ily. '' 256 Furthermore, the Latin American culture of machismo, which
encourages males to be physically and sexually aggressive while
teaching women to be submissive, 7 tends to leave female children
particularly vulnerable to exploitation.
I][. ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH CHILD LABOR IN
GUATEMALA
A number of attempts have been made to address the problem of
child labor in Guatemala, including domestic legal provisions and
administrative programs, as well as the threat of United States trade
sanctions. Thus far, however, these attempted solutions have made
little headway.
258
On paper, Guatemalan law provides for the protection of children.
The Guatemalan Constitution guarantees the protection of minors
252. PRODEN, supra note 145, at 4.
253. See id.
254. See id. note 145, at 4 (citing A. PIO, AJUsTE ECONOMICO Y DESARROLLO
SOCIAL. COMPLEMENTARIDAD 0 CONFLICTO? 9 (1992)).
255. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 167 (commenting that girls work twelve to
fourteen hours a day and are not considered valuable economic components of so-
ciety).
256. Consideration of Reports of States Parties, Initial Report of Guatemala
(CRC/C/3/Add.33 cont'd), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/Sr/307, 12th Sess., June 3, 1996, at
8, para. 47.
257. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 167 (discussing trends in gender relations as
Guatemala becomes more commercialized).
258. See Timothy A. Glut, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An
International Solution To An International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1203, 1223 (criticizing the current national and international attempts to curtail
child labor).
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and the right to an education and contains a lengthy and specific list
of minimal social rights of labor legislation. 25 9 The Constitution also
provides that international human rights treaties and agreements rati-
fied by Guatemala have precedence over domestic law.26u
The Guatemalan Labor Code complies with ILO Convention No.
138 by providing a minimum age of employment of fourteen years.
The General Labor Inspector ("IGT") has discretion to grant permits
to younger children for apprenticeships, when "extreme poverty"
warrants, or when the work is light in duration and intensity.26 Chil-
dren under the age of sixteen are prohibited from dangerous or un-
healthy work as established by regulation or on inspection of the
IGT, and all minors are prohibited from engaging in night work.262
Guatemala's minimum age limits comply with the lower age limits
263allowed for developing countries in ILO Convention No. 138.--
Even this lower limit, however, goes unenforced. The United States
Department of Labor estimates that 5,000 minors have authorization
to work underage, but thousands more work without permits. 2 4
Problems with enforcement can be blamed on both lack of resources
and lack of political will.
265
The labor inspection system is totally inadequate due to a shortage
of inspectors, lack of legal power, and corruption. Inspection is virtu-
ally non-existent outside of the capital city with only a handful of in-
spectors to cover the country, leaving several areas unmonitored.
266
The 1992 Request for Review of Guatemala's GSP status noted an
incident where two children were seriously injured while performing
agricultural labor. Sadly, no inspectors investigated the plantations
259. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA. arts. 51,
71,102.
260. See id. art. 146.
261. See CODIGO DETRABAJO, Decreto No. 1441, art. 150 (Guatemala).
262. See id. arts. 148-149.
263. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that Guate-
mala increase the minimum age to fifteen. See Report on the 12th Session of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRCIC54, July 1, 1996, at 34
para. 216 [hereinafter UNCRC Report].
264. See DOS COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 162, at 459.
265. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 69 (attributing poor labor conditions to
ineffective regulation and ineffective administration).
266. See id. at 65 (describing the underfunded and understaffed inspection de-
partments in Guatemala).
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267where the injuries occurred. Within the city, another handful of la-
bor inspectors is responsible for 14,000 enterprises and more than
300,000 workers. 268 Although the Carpio regime increased the num-
ber of inspectors, there are still far too few of these mostly self-
trained individuals to monitor the number of businesses in Guate-
mala City.
Resources, however, are not the only problem. Maquila owners
often refuse to allow inspectors to enter the plant.269 Bribery of un-
derpaid inspectors is also commonplace. 27 As one worker told Peter-
sen in an interview: "All they do is talk with the boss over some cof-
fee. They never want to talk with us, even though we are the ones
who suffer., 271 Even if an inspector does find a labor code violation,
the fines are so minimal that any deterrent effect is lost.272 The 1992
GSP Petition/Request for Review commented:
Enforcement is reflected ... not only in inspections, but in fines that have
real bite (not minimal fines employers treat as a normal cost of doing
business), in punishing employer representatives who obstruct the formu-
lation of a conciliation tribunal (a problem noted by the Subcommittee), in
reinstatement of workers, in satisfying court judgments against employers
and other markes of labor law enforcement. These are the "markers" of an
effective labour law enforcement effort, and they are lacking in Guate-
mala.273
One of the most important reasons why labor legislation is unen-
forced in Guatemala is because the judicial system is extremely
267. See Petition/Request for Review of Guatemala's GSP Status 26 (June 2,
1992) [hereinafter GSP Petition] (urging the government to take stronger actions to
protect children from exploitation).
268. See id. at 33 (citing government data stating that there were fifteen inspec-
tors in the city in 1992); PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 65 (stating that there were
thirty inspectors in 1992).
269. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 140 (stating that the inspectors are often de-
nied access to plants and are thus unable to investigate complaints); PETERSEN, sit-
pra note 68, at 62.
270. See GSP Petition, supra note 267, at 34 (stating that bribery is indicative of
ineffective labor code enforcement).
271. PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 67.
272. See GSP Petition, supra note 267, at 34 (arguing that employers consider
the small fines a cost of doing business).
273. Id. at 8-9.
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weak.27 4 A system of labor courts is supposed to address violations
of labor legislation. Like other aspects of Guatemala's judicial sys-
tem, however, the labor courts are completely ineffective.275 Ac-
cording to the U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project, only three of
the 1,000 cases of a collective nature that were before the labor
courts in 1997 were resolved.27 6 In its Fourth Report, the Inter-
American Commission condemned the weak response of the judici-
ary to "constant complaints of attacks on minors or institutions that
try to preserve their lives, safety and rights." 77 With respect to the
labor courts, they quoted a Guatemalan magistrate who publicly an-
nounced that judges were "unable to require enforcement of the labor
laws and even rulings, judgments and resolutions, which owners and
businessmen ignore in flagrant disregard for the law." -
The Guatemalan government has announced and implemented a
number of administrative programs aimed at eradicating child labor.
In 1989, the Comision Pro-Convencion Sobre los Derechos del Nino
("PRODEN") was established, and in 1990, the Human Rights Pro-
curador created the Instancia del Defensor de la Ninez Guatemalteca
to monitor the rights of children. 279 The government noted these ac-
complishments in its recent report to the United Nations Committee
274. See BARRY, supra note 120, at 168 (stating that the Guatemalan judicial
system is inefficient).
275. See Glut, supra note 258, at 1223 (stating that labor courts in Guatemala
are not only backlogged and understaffed. but defendants are often free to select
which judge will hear their case).
276. Interview with Stephen Coats, Executive Director of the U.SJGuatemala
Labor Education Project (April 17, 1997): see also Petition Against the Republic of
Guatemala for Violations of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and the Inter-American Con-
vention to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Violence Against Women, Case 11.477,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 6, (unpublished, 1996) (noting that none of 408 cases before the
courts in 1994 were resolved).
277. Fourth Report, supra note 144. at 98.
278. Id. at 91 (quoting the Hon. Jose Mendez Estrada in Lx HORA, Oct. 15,
1992).
279. C'onsideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of
the Convention: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1992. Addendum Guate-
mala, U.N. Comm. On the Rts. Of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRCICI3/Add.33 (1995)
[hereinafter hitial Report of Guatemala] (reporting on the measures Guatemala
has adopted which give effect to the rights recognized in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child).
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on the Rights of the Child. 280 This report also detailed the govern-
ment's recent adoption of a national literacy strategy, including a
plan to coordinate alternative schools on Sundays for working chil-
dren.281 The government also planned to distribute information about
child labor and the Convention to adults and children throughout the
country.282 Additionally, it compiled information on the socio-
economic status of working children.2 83 When this report was con-
sidered by the Committee in 1996, the government noted other ini-
tiatives, including a Social Investment Fund to combat poverty in ru-
ral areas and a school allocations program to compensate parents for
the loss of earnings entailed in sending their children to school.
284
Furthermore, the government committed, under the peace accords, to
significantly increase the amount of money spent on education and
health.285
The Fourth Report noted a few other projects. In 1991 the gov-
ernment announced the creation of a community homes project
where young children could be cared for and educated, and it estab-
lished a school snack program for 1.5 million children. 286 The gov-
ernment also planned a national project entitled the "Strategic Plan to
Resolve the Problems of the Children of the Street" with support
from the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights. 287 NGOs, some-
times with the help of government agencies, have also done a great
deal of work to promote the interests of children. The work of these
groups ranges from spreading knowledge of the UNCRC to provid-
ing food, lodging, and education to street children in Guatemala
City. 288
As positive as these steps are, the actual impact on working chil-
dren has been negligible. Under the Guatemalan government's 1991
280. See id. at 11-13.
281. See id. at 50-51.
282. See id. at 64.
283. See id. at 22.
284. See Initial Report of Guatemala, supra note 279, at 50.
285. UNCRC Consideration, supra note 150, CRC/C/SR.306 at 7 and
CRC/C/SR.308 at 2 & 5.
286. See Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 95 (detailing positive efforts under-
taken by the Guatemalan government).
287. See id. at 97 (noting that implementation was slated for late 1993).
288. See Lave, supra note 216, at 79, 92-97 (detailing the work of NGOs in-
cluding Casa Ahanza, the main provider of services to street children).
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Human Development, Children and Youth Policy, a plan to establish
a community homes project for the care and education of children
under the age of six, only 0.1 percent of the targeted population was
reached by 1993.289 The amount of money spent on social assistance
and welfare in 1990 represented only 0.4 percent of public spending
and amounted to only 1 Quetzal per child (about US $0.20).290
After considering the Guatemalan government's report, the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child commented favorably on the Gua-
temalan delegation's openness "in acknowledging the problems, dif-
ficulties and challenges facing the State party in implementing the
principles and provisions of the Convention."29' The Committee
went on to note, however, the inadequacy of the measures adopted by
Guatemala to implement the Convention and the insufficient meas-
ures taken to promote widespread awareness of the Convention. The
Committee also expressed numerous concerns about: the adequacy of
measures to ensure the economic, social, and cultural rights of chil-
dren; the fact that the majority of children were not attending school;
the "inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the measures designed to en-
sure the establishment of appropriate standards and to monitor the
working conditions of children;" the persistence of child labor and
the government's "lack of accurate assessment [of the] dimensions of
the phenomenon;" the insufficient support given to families with se-
vere problems; and the alarming persistence of violence against chil-
dren.
292
The Fourth Report also noted, with respect to street children, that
the government programs are laudable but:
[T]he goals and accomplishments announced thus show that these solu-
tions are far too modest for the enormity of the problems .... The solu-
tions being suggested seem even more inadequate when one considers the
enormity of the acts attributable to State agents, which demonstrate how
many are utterly uncommitted to a policy of respecting children and mi-
289. See id. at 91 (detailing aspects of the Human Development, Children and
Youth policy aimed at reaching poor children).
290. See id. at 91 (describing Guatemalan social policies). The Guatemalan unit
of currency is the Quetzal. See id.
291. UNCRC Report, supra note 263, at 31, para. 193.
292. Id. at 32-34 paras. 201-214.
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nors and to their growth and development in freedom and responsibil-
ity.
293
Indeed, despite these programs and legislation prohibiting child la-
bor, the number of working children in Guatemala continues to grow.
In reality, the government's efforts to eradicate child labor can be
likened to using a bandage to stop bleeding from a gaping wound.
The Guatemalan state would argue that, as a developing nation, it
simply cannot afford either a bigger bandage or the major surgery
needed to correct the problem. The lack of resources of both the state
and the NGOs working within Guatemala, as well as the difficult
economic circumstances described above, are serious limitations. No
one expects child labor to be eradicated overnight.
Nevertheless, part of the problem is a lack of will on the State's
part, if not its outright collusion with the economic elite. The factory
and plantation owners believe they have a stake in ensuring that the
socio-economic status of the majority does not improve. For exam-
ple, the government has refused to entertain even modest proposals
for land reform that are widely considered necessary to rebalance the
294distribution of wealth. In the name of economic development, the
government has wholeheartedly assisted the growth of the maquila-
dora industry despite the reputation of the maquilas for their labor
abuses, including use of child labor. 295 A few years ago, a hidden
camera at an exposition sponsored by the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development caught government representatives from several
Central American countries, including Guatemala, underbidding each
293. Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 98 (stating that massive measures must
be undertaken to resolve the human rights dilemma facing Guatemalan children).
294. See ROBERT TRUDEAU, GUATEMALAN POLITICS: THE POPULAR STRUGGLE
FOR DEMOCRACY 98 (1993) (describing government opposition to agrarian re-
form); cf Jim Handy, Democracy, Military Rule and Agrarian Reform in Guate-
mala, in CENTRAL AMERICA: DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 27, 29
(John M. Kirk & George W. Schuyler eds., 1988) (describing various governmen-
tal efforts to redistribute land).
295. See PETERSEN, supra note 68, at 132-35 (describing government efforts to
support the maquilas); Jennifer Bol, Using the Inter-American System to Pursue
International Labour Rights: A Case Study of the Guatemalan Maquiladoras, 55
U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 351, 357 (1997).
1180 [13:1135
CHILD LABOR IN GUATEMALA
other in an attempt to offer the lowest wage rates to a potential
American investor.
296
Guatemala has consistently refused to intervene in situations of
gross violations of labor rights, including violence against union or-
ganizers. The Empresa Exacta case, 297 currently before the Inter-
American Commission, is one example. Workers from the Empresa
Exacta plantation were owed back pay and took their case to the
courts. After two years without any judicial response, they decided to
stage a sit-in at the plantation. The military arrived, opened fire on
the workers, and killed several employees. At the government's re-
quest, this case is in the "friendly settlement" stage at the Commis-
sion, but little is happening.
The twenty-two complaints taken to the ILO's Committee on
Freedom of Association between 1984 and 1995 also demonstrate the
government's lack of will to ensure labor rights. Allegations by na-
tional and international trade unions to this committee range from
failure to recognize unions to lack of governmental response to the
threats, murders, and disappearances of union leaders. In several
cases, the government has not responded to the complaint or has re-
sponded partially or only in general terms, a source of frustration to
the Committee.
298
296. See 60 Minutes: Hiring Rosa Martinez (CBS television broadcast), cited in
Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165, 174-75 (1993) (detailing minimum wage abuses world
wide).
297. Case 11.273, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1996) (Guatemala) (hereinafter Empresa
Exacta case).
298. See Complaint against the Government of Guatemala presented by the Uni-
fied Trade Union Confederation of Guatemala (CUSG), Report no. 259/Case no.
1459 (1988), available in ILOLEX. See, e.g., Complaints presented by the World
Federation of Trade Unions, the National Committee of Trade Union Activity of
Guatemala and the Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala against the
Government of Guatemala, Report no. 238/Case no. 1262 (1984); Complaints
against the Government of Guatemala presented by the Latin American Central of
Workers (CLAT), Report no. 287/Case no. 1666 (1992), available in ILOLEX. In
1988, the government responded to a complaint with full details; the Committee
commented that this was "particularly gratifying since for many years the commit-
tee has had occasion to regret the Government's lack of cooperation in the proce-
dure and since it was obliged, many times, to examine the substance of a great
many complaints without having any information or observations from the Gov-
ernment at its disposal."
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The low level of spending on social services, particularly educa-
tion, also shows that the lack of a concerted effort to stop child labor
is not entirely attributable to a lack of resources. In 1994, Guatemala
spent 15.2 percent of its budget on defense and 29.5 percent of its
budget on social services-including health, education, social secu-
rity, welfare, housing, and community services. 299 Despite increasing
poverty and an unofficial end to the civil war, this represents a fifty
percent increase in the defense budget and a slight decrease in social
spending since 1980.300 In comparison, El Salvador spent 8.7 percent
of its budget on defense and 39.4 percent on social services in
1994; 30 1 Nicaragua spent 5.7 percent and 45.5 percent respec-
tively;3°2 and Costa Rica spent zero percent and 61.3 percent, respec-
tively.
30 3
U.S. trade mechanisms have been used to pressure Guatemala and
other developing countries into taking their human rights commit-
ments more seriously. The General System of Preferences ("GSP")
304
is designed to give non-reciprocal duty preferences to developing
economies, such as Guatemala, to promote exports of manufactured
goods. 305 Amendments to this legislation in 1984 provided that these
preferences could be taken away for failure to comply with interna-
tionally recognized worker rights, which included a minimum age for
employment.
30 6





303. See id. at214-15.
304. General System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 246 1-
2467 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998).
305. See Matthew Bazzano, Child Labor: What the United States and Its Corpo-
rations Can Do To Eliminate Its Use, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 200, 210
(1996) (stating that the President can take workers' rights into account when
granting trade preferences); Elizabeth Iglesias, Human Rights in International
Economic Law: Locating Latinas/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 361, 366-69 (detailing the GSP process, including the labor rights
conditionality).
306. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462(b)(2)(G) (West 1980 & Supp. 1998). A number of
other U.S. statutes also condition trade on recognition of internationally recognized
worker rights. The GSP legislation, however, is the only one which provides a pe-
tition and review procedure.
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Between 1986 and 1992, American labor rights groups have chal-
lenged Guatemala's GSP status every year. The first time, Guatemala
was held to be in compliance. For the next five years, the petitions
failed for lack of information.307 In 1992, a petition that contained
allegations of child labor violations was accepted. The GSP Sub-
committee undertook a full review of Guatemala's labor conditions.
The threat of losing its GSP status prompted the Guatemalan gov-
ernment to pass revisions to update its Labor Code and authorize the
only existing union in a maquila plant.308 In the end, Guatemala's
GSP status was not revoked.
While the GSP's labor rights clause has had some positive effect
by pressuring governments like Guatemala, its reach is limited. The
statute only requires that States take steps to improve labor stan-
dards.309 Since these standards are not explicitly linked to the rele-
vant ILO conventions, American administrators have a great deal of
discretion in interpreting the vaguely stated obligations.31t° More im-
portantly, the legislation lacks legitimacy as a unilaterally-imposed
sanction applied by a country that has not ratified most ILO conven-
tions and has an imperfect record with respect to labor rights. - 1 Most
307. See Amy Belanger, Note, Internationally Recognized Worker Rights and
the Efficacy of the Generalized System of Preferences: A Guatemahn Case Study,
11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101. 124-25 (1996) (stating that the United States
rejected the petitions because they failed to meet informational requirements).
308. See ANN. REP. INTER-AM. C.H.R., Guatemala, 399 OEA/Ser.IJV/ll.85,
413 n.26 (1993). The CAMOSA union at the Phillips Van Heusen factory was rec-
ognized in 1992. See Fiona Ortiz, Guatemala Workers Cheer Recognition of New
Union, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 20, 1997, at C4. The company has recently an-
nounced it would negotiate with the union. See id.
309. See Iglesias, supra note 305, at 367 (outlining the requirements for presi-
dential certification).
310. See International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 495, 497 (D.D.C. 1990), affd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
"GSP contains no specification as to how the President shall make his [GSPJ de-
termination").
311. The United States has ratified only one of the core ILO conventions on
freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibi-
tion of forced labor and child labor, and equality of treatment. See Table 2, infra.
For a discussion of labor rights abuses in the United States, see Dennis Hayashi,
Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industr': A Proposed
Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 195 (1992) (de-
tailing labor abuse in the American garment industry): Neil Freedman, Comment, A
Human Rights Approach to the Labor Rights of Undocumented Workers, 74 C.AL
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frustrating for groups trying to use this mechanism has been the reti-
cence of the government to actually apply trade sanctions, unless a
country is not considered to be a foreign policy concern of the United
312States. To date only ten countries have had their trade privileges
suspended or revoked under this legislation, although dozens have
been petitioned.3 13
A lawsuit by human rights groups against President Bush and the
U.S. Trade Representative in 1990 alleged that the government failed
to enforce the worker rights provisions of the GSP legislation con-
sistent with the language and intent of Congress. 314 The plaintiffs
also alleged that the government improperly screened petitions on the
basis of factors not covered by the legislation and did not make the
reasons for its decisions clear.3 15 In dismissing the case, the district
court held that the President must always be given wide discretion in
areas of foreign policy, and the apparent total lack of standards in the
legislation made court interpretation impossible.
3 16
These problems highlight the difficulties of using unilateral trade
sanctions to target human rights violations, such as child labor. Al-
though unilateral trade sanctions could potentially provide a signifi-
cant amount of pressure on states like Guatemala to make changes,
they lack the legitimacy necessary to be a consistent and effective
tool to fight child labor. Linking trade and labor rights at the multi-
L. REV. 1715 (1986) (discussing labor rights violations affecting undocumented
workers).
312. See e.g., Theresa Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States
Trade Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 116
(1990) (stating that sanctioned countries are usually politically disfavored).
313. See Benjamin Davis, Note, The Effects of Worker Rights Protections in
United States Trade Laws: A Case Study of El Salvador, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1167, 1173 (1995) (describing the petition process as having substantive
and procedural deficiencies): see also Karen Travis, Women in Global Production
and Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 173, 184
(1992) (noting that the GSP program continues to be the major tool used for chal-
lenging worker rights violations). These ten nations include: Burma, Liberia, Mau-
ritania, Nicaragua, Romania, Syria, and Sudan. In addition, Chile, Central African
Republic, and Paraguay were reinstated in 1991. See Davis, supra, at 1173 n.28
(listing countries punished under GSP legislation).
314. See International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund, 752 F. Supp. at
496.
315. See id. at 498-99.
316. See id. at 499.
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lateral level would have greater legitimacy, but attempts to do so
have not been successful. Moreover, trade sanctions provide an all-
or-nothing solution-either a country loses its trade benefits or it
does not. This process is not directly aimed at curing the problem,
since it does not provide flexible remedies designed specifically for
actual improvement of labor conditions.
IV. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO FIGHT CHILD LABOR
A. WHY THERE IS A ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Guatemalan state has adopted thus far grossly inadequate
measures to deal with the growing problem of child labor. Pressure
on the government to address the problem has been limited and inef-
fective. As a result, there may be a role for international law and in-
ternational litigation in fighting child labor in Guatemala.
Use of international tribunals has three inter-related advantages
over other methods: pressure, publicity, and legitimacy. International
law is frequently criticized as being unenforceable. However, the
ability of international bodies to pressure states to uphold their inter-
national obligations should not be underestimated. Recommenda-
tions and judgments from international bodies can apply much
greater pressure than can be applied from interest groups either
within the state or internationally. This increased pressure is due in
large part to the greater publicity attached to an international forum.
Tribunals with the authority to deliver binding judgments have the
greatest potential to pressure states into compliance with their inter-
national obligations. Several international human rights treaties have
monitoring bodies that require states' parties to write regular reports
detailing compliance. 1 7 As noted in Part VI, these requirements are
not always met. Nevertheless, reporting requirements also apply
some pressure on states to explain their actions. Such pressure is
likely to have some effect on Guatemala, which is concerned with its
317. See Laurence Heifer & Anne Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effec-
five Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338 (describing the reporting
procedures of the UNHRC regarding the International Covenant on Civil & Politi-
cal Rights); Marilla Sardenberg, Committee on the Rights of the Child: Basic Proc-
esses, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 263, 272 (detailing reporting re-
quirements of the UNCRC under the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
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international image and has attempted during the past decade to shed
the notorious reputation it gained during the Civil War.31 8 Since its
return to democracy in 1986, Guatemala has ratified about fifty inter-
national human rights instruments, including the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("Economic Cove-
nant"),319 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and several ILO Conventions.
Guatemala was one of the first countries to ratify the UNCRC in
1990.321
Publicity of human rights issues in international human rights
bodies increases the pressure on states to comply with their interna-
tional obligations. If publicity of a case or an issue reaches a signifi-
cant number of people across the world, it serves to legitimize and
popularize human rights issues. Popularization may in turn lead to
pressure on other actors who have a role to play in reducing the inci-
dence of child labor. For example, publicity could lead to stronger
lobbying for companies to adopt corporate codes of conduct or to set3 22
up independent monitoring of subcontracting arrangements.- Nega-
tive publicity also puts pressure on institutions such as the World
Bank to be more careful about the effects of development programs
or structural adjustment policies on the population of developing
countries.
318. See Stephanie Roos, Democracy and Elections in Guatemala, 21-SPG
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 97 (1997) (providing a broad view of the Guatemalan
government's injustices to its own people and examining reform efforts).
319. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3.
1976) [hereinafter Economic Covenant].
320. See Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Ques-
lion: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
117, 146 n.169 (stating that Guatemala ratified a number of ILO Conventions, in-
cluding union rights conventions).
321. See Lave, supra note 216, at 81 (stating that Guatemala was the sixth coun-
try to ratify the UNCRC).
322. See generally Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrer, Enforcing
International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995) (examining private sector efforts to police labor rights
through corporate codes of conduct); Jorge Perez-Lopez, Promoting International
Respect for Workers Rights Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1 (1993) (examining the application of codes of conduct to American
corporations located abroad).
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Finally, international human rights bodies generally have a high
degree of legitimacy since states have chosen to ratify the treaties that
create these bodies and the norms that they apply. In contrast to uni-
laterally imposed sanctions, such as American trade legislation, there
is a high degree of legitimacy in the norms contained in widely-
ratified international instruments, and states are more likely to com-
ply with the recommendations or judgments of such bodies if they
have agreed to uphold such norms. The legitimacy derived from in-
ternational instruments is particularly relevant to the issue of child
labor since not all countries agree on the definition of childhood or
how states should deal with the problem.
There are, of course, many limitations to the use of the interna-
tional legal system, some of which will be discussed in Part VI. Cer-
tainly, the judgment of an international tribunal cannot cure child la-
bor; it is not in itself the surgery that is needed. But as Judge Thomas
Buergenthal of the Inter-American Court has noted:
My fellow judges and I are neither so naive nor inexperienced as to think
that the Court, or, for that matter, any judicial institution, can solve all or
even most human rights problems confronting our hemisphere .... Like
medical doctors, who also treat mainly symptoms, courts can do a great
deal of good without being able to affect the underlying causes. For ex-
ample, there is a great need, in our hemisphere to legitimize the human
rights debate, to give the people of our region some tangible examples of
international human fights justice and to demonstrate that it is possible to
resolve many human rights issues without resort to violence.i'2
B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OPTIONS
There are several international mechanisms available to examine
whether Guatemala has breached its international obligations with
respect to child labor. Most of these mechanisms are bodies estab-
lished to monitor U.N. treaties and have previously considered the
problems facing children in Guatemala. A brief outline of these
mechanisms demonstrates their limitations in applying pressure to
the Guatemalan government, and why the use of the Inter-American
system may be a better option.
323. ScoT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUM.N RIGHTS 5
(1992) (quoting Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and the OAS, 7 HuM. RTs. L.J. 157, 164 (1986)).
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1. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The Economic Covenant, 324 which deals specifically with the eco-
nomic exploitation of children in art. 10(3), was ratified by Guate-
mala in 1988. The eighteen-member Committee on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights is composed of independent experts from all
over the world who receive reports on measures adopted by the states
parties pursuant to their obligations under the Economic Covenant.
325
The Committee is dependent on states' parties submitting reports un-
326der the Convention as required. Despite attempts to improve its ef-
fectiveness at supervising the Convention, however, overdue reports
and failure to report are common. In addition, governments fre-
quently do not send experts to Geneva to discuss their reports with
the Committee. 327 The Committee is authorized to make comments
and recommendations to states' parties on ways to improve their ob-
servance of the Covenant. 328 The reports or summaries thereof can be
forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, specialized agencies
of the United Nations, or the General Assembly.
329
Guatemala's latest report to the Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights was examined during the Committee's four-
teenth session in 1996. Among the Committee's recommendations
were a call for increased emphasis on social welfare, including health
and education, and greater attention to commitment for women's
rights, union rights, and protection against child labor.
330
2. Committee on the Rights of the Child
The UNCRC has also provided for a body to receive and review
reports of states' parties on measures they have taken to comply with
the Convention. 33 1 Like the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, this Committee is highly dependent on voluntary
324. Economic Covenant, supra note 319, at 46.
325. See BETTEN, supra note 97, at 432 (discussing state parties' negative views
towards the reporting procedures).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See Economic Covenant, supra note 319, Pt. IV arts. 19-21.
329. See id. art. 22.
330. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concludes Four-
teenth Session, Press Release HR/4298 (May 21, 1996).
331. See UNCRC, supra note 16, arts. 43-45.
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compliance by states' parties with their reporting obligations and is
limited to making comments and recommendations for improve-
ments.332 Guatemala was one of the first countries to ratify the
UNCRC.3 33 The Committee received the initial report in 1995 and
examined it in 1996. As noted above, the Committee expressed con-
cern over the inadequate measures taken by Guatemala to address the
issue of child labor. One of the Committee's recommendations was
that "all necessary measures be adopted to ensure that children have
access to education and that they are protected from involvement in
exploitative activities. 334
3. The Human Rights Committee
Like the committees above, the Human Rights Committee is a
United Nations treaty body, functioning under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights ("Civil and Political Cove-
nant").335 The Human Rights Committee differs from the two com-
mittees considered above, however, since it not only considers regu-
lar reports of states parties but can also hear complaints lodged by
individuals. 336 Unfortunately, this mechanism is very limited since
individuals can only petition against states that have ratified both the
Convention and its Optional Protocol. Many states, including
Guatemala, have not.
Even if Guatemala had signed the Optional Protocol, this method
of recourse would not be effective. NGOs do not have standing to
bring petitions under the Optional Protocol; complaints must be
launched by actual victims of human rights violations, or if the vic-
332. See Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and
Children For Prostitution: Making It Live Up To Its Potential, 10 H.ARv. HUM.
RTS. J. 213, 236 (describing the limitation on Committee recommendations as a
drawback to state reporting procedures).
333. See Lave, supra note 216, at 81 (stating that Guatemala was the sixth nation
to ratify the UNCRC).
334. UNCRC Report, supra note 263, at 37 para. 231.
335. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.. Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [herein-
after Civil and Political Covenant].
336. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 40,
at 110, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984) [hereinafter Report of the Human Rights Com-
mittee].
337. See Economic Covenant, supra note 319, art. 1.
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tim is unavailable, by the victim's representatives. 338 In countries like
Guatemala, it is difficult for complaints to be brought forward be-
cause most people are extremely poor and unaware of their rights.
The nature of economic rights makes them particularly difficult to
pursue where the actual victim must bring the petition. In the case of
child labor, for example, the individual victims of violations are chil-
dren, and in most cases, neither they nor their parents want them to
stop working in the short-term. Governments, after all, generally, do
not directly force children to work. The problem is that governments
fail to act to ensure that labor rights and children's rights are pro-
tected.33 9
The regular reporting requirements under the ICCPR face the same
limitations as the previous two committees. The Human Rights
Committee is dependent on states' parties complying with reporting
requirements and is not a tribunal capable of delivering a binding
judgment. 340 The Committee's Final Views ask states' parties to pro-
vide information on what they have done to remedy any breach of
their obligations; however, the Committee lacks the power to enforce
compliance with these views.
34 1
Finally, the Human Rights Committee is limited to examining al-
legations of violations of the rights contained in the Civil and Politi-
cal Covenant. 342 Although Article 24(1) provides for the right of
children "to such measures of protection as are required by his status
as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State," 343 this in-
strument does not deal specifically with the issue of child labor or
other economic rights.
When the Committee considered Guatemala's initial report in
1996, the Guatemalan delegation admitted that, until 1994, the coun-
338. See id.
339. See Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Invest-
ment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663,
668 (1997) (arguing that "[m]ost extreme forms of child labor are perpetrated by
private actors with the acquiescence of public officials").
340. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 336, at 117 (de-
scribing the Committee's attempts to urge compliance with its decisions by ap-
pointing rapporteurs and conducting on-site fact-finding missions in individual
countries).
341. See id.
342. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 335, art. 40.
343. Id. art. 24(1).
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try had not complied with its obligation of submitting reports under
the Covenant. 344 The only issue concerning children raised in the
consideration of the 1996 report was the problem of street chil-
dren.
345
4. The International Labour Organization
Child labor has been a central concern of the ILO since the
founding of the organization. Several conventions address the subject
of minors. The most important convention is ILO Convention No.
138, which provides for a minimum age of employment.:14
States' parties are expected to submit reports at regular intervals
describing the measures taken to comply with the conventions they
have ratified.347 An independent Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations ("CEACR") evaluates
member states' compliance with conventions in a non-public exami-
nation.348 If reports of states' parties are unclear or incomplete, the
government in question may be asked for more information." In se-
rious cases, the Committee may decide to include a case in a "special
paragraph" in its report, or more rarely, to list it as a "continued fail-
ure to implement" a Convention. 35 The Committee reports to the
ILO Conference. The Conference Committee on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations then hears selected cases. This
Committee is unique among international bodies because it is com-
posed of representatives not only of governments, but also of em-
344. See Human Rights Conunittee Begins Consideration of Guatemala's Initial
Report, Press Release HR/CT/459 (March 26, 1996).
345. See Human Rights Conunittee Continues Considering Guatemala's Initial
Report, Press Release HR/CT/463 (March 28, 1996).
346. See Breen Creighton, Combating Child Labour: The Role Qf International
Laour Standards, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 362, 371 (1997) (discussing the role of ILO
Convention No. 138 in establishing minimum age standards).
347. See ILO Convention No. 138 Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment, June 26, 1973 [hereinafter ILO Convention 1381. in INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CoNvENTIONS AND
RECOMSENDATIONS: 1919-1981, 730 (1982).
348. See Creighton, supra note 346, at 372-73 n. 48 (describing the CEACR re-
view process).
349. See VICTOR YvEs GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION:
A CASE STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIALISED AGENCIES
238 (1989).
350. See id. at 225.
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ployer and employee organizations. Reports of the Conference
Committee are usually adopted by the plenary Conference.
The ILO has several specialized mechanisms as well. The Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association is a special committee of the ILO
Governing Body set up to deal specifically with allegations of viola-
tions of the right to freedom of association. 351 In addition, Article 24
of the LO Constitution provides for representations to the ILO from
international or national employer or employee organizations if a
member state fails to effectively ensure the provisions of a Conven-
tion.352 A tripartite committee of the Governing Body examines these
representations and communicates them to the government in-
volved.353 If a response is not received from the government or is in-
adequate, the representation may be published.354
Finally, Article 26 of the Constitution provides for inter-state
complaints. 355 These complaints are also examined by the Governing
Body and communicated to the government in question. The matter
may be settled, or a Commission of Inquiry may be appointed to
thoroughly consider the complaint. 356 Such an inquiry includes call-
ing witnesses, examining documentation, and making unannounced
visits to the member state. The Commission of Inquiry writes a report
containing its conclusions and recommendations that is sent to the
Governing Body and the governments involved and is then pub-
lished.357 Governments must inform the Director-General of the ILO
whether they accept the recommendations and, if not, whether they
intend to refer the complaint to the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").
Guatemala has ratified 169 ILO conventions, including ILO Con-
vention No. 138 and most of the conventions containing core labor
rights (see Tables 1 and 2). In 1994 and 1995, Guatemala did not
submit any of the reports that were due; however, all of its reports
351. Seeid. at238.
352. See Creighton, supra note 346, at 383.
353. See GHEBALI, supra note 349, at 238.
354. See id.
355. The Governing Body may also decide to submit a representation to the
complaint procedure.
356. See Creighton, supra note 346, at 383.
357. See id. at 385 n. 106.
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were submitted in 1996.358 As an illustration of the insufficient pres-
sure applied by the ILO, the CEACR noted in its individual com-
ments on Convention No. 105 in 1996 that its concern about compul-
sory penal work in Guatemala "has been the subject of comment for
more than ten years." 359 Guatemala has also been the subject of more
than 100 direct requests for information from the Committee in the
past few years with respect to its reporting obligations on various
conventions, including ILO Convention No. 138 .3bU
Table 1. ILO Child Labor Conventions Ratified by Guatemala
No. Title Ratified by
Guatemala
5 Minimum Age (Industry), 1919 No
59 Minimum Age (Industry) (Revised), 1937 Yes
7 Minimum Age (Sea), 1920 No
58 Minimum Age (Sea) (Revised). 1936 Yes
10 Minimum Age (Agriculture), 1921 Yes
15 Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers), 1921 Yes
33 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment), 1932 No
60 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) No
(Revised), 1937
112 Minimum Age (Fishermen). 1959 Yes
123 Minimum Age (Underground Work), 1965 No
138 Minimum Age, 1973 Yes
358. See International Labour Organization. REPORT OF THE: CEACR: GENERAL
REPORT AND OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING PARTICULAR COUNTRIES, International
Labour Conf., 81st Sess. (1994); REPORT OF THE CEACR: GENERAL REPORT AND
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING PARTICULAR COUNTRIES. International Labour Conf.,
82nd Sess. (1995); REPORT OF THE CEACR: GENERAL REPORT AND
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING PARTICULAR COUNTRIES. International Labour Conf.,
83rd Sess. (1996) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE CEACR, 19961.
359. REPORTOFTHECEACR, 1996. supra note 358. at 248.
360. See Individual Direct Requests Concerning Convention No. 138 (submitted
1994, Feb. 1995, and Dec. 1995), available in ILOLEX: REPORT OF THE CEACR,
1996, supra note 358, at 367.
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There has never been an inter-state complaint made against Gua-
temala at the ILO. One representation, which was made under Article
24 by unions, alleged non-observance of the two conventions on
forced labor. 36 The decision is still pending. As noted above, Gua-
temala has been the subject of several complaints to the Committee
on Freedom of Association. 362 The Committee has noted its deep
concern about the seriousness of allegations of violence against un-
ion organizers. The government's response to these complaints, when
they have occurred at all, has often been inadequate.
363
Table 2. Other Core ILO Conventions Ratified by Guatemala
No. Title Date of
Ratification
29 Forced Labour Convention, 1929 1989
87 Right of Association and Protection of the Right to 1952
98 Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Con- 1952
100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 1961
105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 1959
111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Con- 1960
vention, 1958
5. The International Court of Justice
Unlike the other mechanisms explained above, the International
Court of Justice is a full tribunal with the authority to deliver a bind-
ing judgment.3 6 Unfortunately, Guatemala has not accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, only states have
361. See Representation by the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Ho-
tel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF) and
Public Servants International (PSI), art. 24, available in ILOLEX (alleging non-
observance of C29 and C105 on forced labor).
362. See generally, supra note 298.
363. See generally, supra note 298.
364. See generally Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International
Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 131 (1997).
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standing to bring claims before the ICJ. 365 As with other human
rights claims-perhaps even more so with child labor, given its con-
troversial nature-it is extremely unlikely that any state would bring
a claim against another state on this issue. Even if child labor were
considered, the judgments of the ICJ tend to be quite conservative
compared to those of regional human rights tribunals, reflecting the
lesser degree of consensus on both international law and jurisdiction
facing this truly universal forum. The ICJ would thus be a poor
choice of forum to bring a novel complaint such as a child labor pe-
tition.
V. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION
AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Guatemala appears to have improved its compliance with its re-
porting obligations to the various treaty bodies in recent years, indi-
cating a greater willingness to be bound by the norms the treaties ap-
ply. None of these mechanisms would allow an individual complaint
on the subject of child labor in Guatemala or give NGOs standing to
launch such a complaint. Furthermore, only the ICJ could provide a
binding judgment, but it is not an available option for Guatemala be-
cause Guatemala has not subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ.
The ILO mechanisms are probably the strongest options presented
thus far because they involve both regular reporting and a complaint
procedure. The representation and complaint mechanisms do not,
however, allow individuals to bring complaints and tend to be used
infrequently. As for the Committees, they are hampered by their reli-
ance on the reports of states' parties, which are frequently late or in-
complete. As with all the monitoring bodies, concern about human
rights violations is limited to diplomatically worded suggestions. The
ILO Committees can send observations to a government in breach of
its obligations; however, these observations never contain stronger
language than "concern" or "regret.,
366
365. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, ch. II, art.
34(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
366. See BETrEN, supra note 97, at 398.
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For these reasons, as well as the increased legitimacy of regional
human rights systems over universal ones, the Inter-American system
is the best choice of an international forum for a child labor com-
plaint against Guatemala. The Inter-American system for the protec-
tion of human rights is a two-tiered system consisting of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. 367 The system accepts petitions from indi-
viduals or groups alleging human rights violations. 368 Petitions must
first be sent to the Commission, which sits in Washington, D.C.
36
After receiving all the relevant information, the Commission writes a
report containing its conclusions and recommendations. 31 If the dis-
pute is not amenable to a friendly settlement, the Commission may
decide to send the case to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, located in San Jose, Costa Rica, for a binding judgment.
371
The Inter-American Commission is very similar to the regional
human rights system in Europe upon which it was modeled. 3" The
later development of the Inter-American system, however, combined
with the specific political situation in the region, allowed it to im-
prove on the framework of both the European and the United Nations
systems. 373 Shelton authoritatively states that the Inter-American
system "has evolved into the most ambitious institutional framework
in the world for promoting and protecting human rights."
374
This section will first outline the history and function of the Inter-
American Commission and Court, the two principle human rights in-
367. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 33.
368. See id. art. 44.
369. See id.
370. See id. art. 41.
371. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 232 (1982).
372. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 19 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
373. But see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 481
(Frank Newman & David Weissbrodt eds., 2d ed. 1996) (stating that the European
Court is "unique among international bodies because routinely it imposes sanctions
on governments for violating the human rights of their nationals").
374. Dinah Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protection: Recommendations for
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 323,
323 (1988).
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struments they apply, the American Convention on Human Rights,
and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. The
section will then consider the benefits of this system over other hu-
man rights bodies. Finally, the section will take a closer look at what
a child labor petition in the Inter-American system might look like,
including the relevant human rights norms that could be applied.
A. WHAT IS THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM?
The Inter-American human rights system functions within the
framework of the Organization of American States ("OAS"), a re-
gional organization of the United Nations based in Washington D.C.
Any American state can become a member of the OAS by ratifying
the OAS Charter.375 Today, all 35 American states have ratified the
OAS Charter and are member states376 with the exception of Cuba,
which was removed from the OAS by a resolution of the Fifth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1962.
7 -
Among the principles affirmed in the OAS Charter are respect for
the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to
race, nationality, creed, or sex, as well as economic and social stan-
dards toward which states are to progress. 378 The Conference, at
which the Charter was adopted, also adopted a more expansive hu-
man rights document. The American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man developed from a resolution on the protection of hu-
man rights adopted at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of
War and Peace in March 1945 in Mexico City. The presentation and
375. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, art. 4, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967) (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951), 6 1.L.M.
310 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The Charter was adopted at the Ninth International
Conference of American States in Bogota in 1948 by the 21 American states, who
participated: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil. Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Venezuela.
376. The 14 later additions are: Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago (1967): Jamaica
(1969); Grenada (1975); Suriname (1977); Dominica, St. Lucia (1979); Antigua
and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1981); Bahamas (1982); St. Kitts
and Nevis (1984); Canada (1990); Belize, and Guyana (1991).
377. See Jo N. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth
Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U.
INT'LL.J. 321, 339 n.108 (1994).
378. See OAS Charter, supra note 375, arts. 3(k. 29-51.
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adoption of the American Declaration at the 1948 conference made it
the first international instrument of its type adopted at this level, al-
though it did not achieve the status of a convention.
379
The OAS Charter also created a number of organs. The most im-
portant is the General Assembly, the political body that decides on
the general policy and action of the organization and is composed of
380all member states. Other OAS organs are the Meeting of Consul-
tation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, three Councils (the Permanent
Council, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and the
Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture), the
Inter-American Judicial Committee, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, the General Secretariat, and a number of special-
ized organizations, such as the Pan American Health Organization."
38
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which became a
principle organ of the OAS following an amendment to the Charter
in 1965, 382 has the primary responsibility for promoting and protect-
ing human rights in the hemisphere.
The Inter-American Commission is composed of seven members
elected for four-year terms by the Council of the OAS from names
submitted by OAS member states. 383 The Commission was created in
1959 at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs in Santiago, Chile. The Resolution, entitled "Human Rights,"
created the Inter-American Commission to watch over the rights set
out in the American Declaration. 384 The resolution also requested the
Inter-American Council of Jurists to prepare a draft convention on
human rights and a draft convention creating an Inter-American
379. See BAsIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 6.
380. See OAS Charter, supra note 375, ch. IX, art. 53.
381. See id. arts. 60, 79, 92, 104, 111 & 112.
382. The amended Charter entered into force in 1970. Article 51 makes the
Commission a principle organ. See OAS Charter, supra note 375, art. 51. Article
112 states that the Commission's principle function shall be "to promote the obser-
vance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the
Organization in these matters." Id. art. 112.
383. See Jose Mendez & Jose Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American
Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 507, 520
(1990).
384. Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago,
Chile, Final Act, at 10, OAS Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.C/II.5, (August 12-18, 1959)
[hereinafter Fifth Meeting].
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Court and other organs "sufficient to assure the protection and obser-
vance" of the rights enumerated in the convention.
5
This draft convention on human rights became the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. 386 Closely modeled on the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the United Nations Civil and Political
Covenant, it was drafted in 1969 and entered into force on July 18,
1978 on the deposit of the eleventh instrument of ratification. The
purpose of the American Convention is to accord protection, both in
the international sphere and under the domestic law of the American
states, to the "essential rights of man." 387 As of 1997, twenty-five of
the thirty-five OAS member states had ratified the American Con-
vention.
388
Originally, the Commission was conceived of more as a study
group concerned with abstract investigations of human rights than as
a body pursuing individual complaints. The character of the Com-
mission was reflected in the limited authority given to the Commis-
sion under its first statute.389 The Commission had no authority to
send individual communications to governments nor could it oblige
them to respond or explain what had happened where a violation of
rights was alleged.390 The Eighth Meeting of Consultation in 1962
gave voice to this frustration, stating that "'the inadequacy of the fac-
ulties and attributions conferred upon [the Commission] by its Stat-
ute" had made it difficult "for the Commission to fulfill its assigned
mission.' 391 The Meeting recommended that the statute be broadened
and strengthened.392
The Commission's statute was amended in 1965. giving it author-
ity "[t]o examine communications submitted to it and any other
385. Id.
386. See generally American Convention, supra note 4.
387. Id. at preamble.
388. The 10 member states who have not ratified the Conention are: Anttgua&
Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Cuba, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the United States.
389. See generally Claudio Grossman, Proposals to Strengthen the Inter-
American System of Protection of Human Rights, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 264
(1990).
390. See generally id.
391. Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affirs. Punta del
Este, Uruguay, Final Act, at 16-17, OAS Off. Rec., OEA/ser.C/I1.8. (1962).
392. See id.
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available information, so that it may address to the government of
any American State a request for information... so that it may make
recommendations.., with the objective of bringing about a more ef-
fective observance of fundamental human rights." 393 Specifically, the
new statute required that an accused state respond to allegations
against it. The statute also gave the Commission the authority to
publish resolutions with its conclusions and recommendations on pe-
titions once fact-finding was completed.
The statute was approved in October 1979, 394 and has strengthened
the Commission's ability to act on individual petitions. The statute
also provides a procedure for inter-state complaints and for friendly
settlement.395 For the first time, specific authorization to carry out
on-site investigations appears. 396 Of particular importance is the in-
clusion of the power to request advisory opinions from the Court on
the interpretation of the American Convention or other relevant trea-
ties.3 97
The Commission has several distinct functions besides examining
complaints brought forward by individuals or groups. These include
initiation of its own proceedings with respect to human rights viola-
tions, conducting country-wide studies on human rights conditions,
including on-site visits, 398 providing interim measures, 399 making
393. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 9,
GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES & HUMAN RIGHTS 1960-1967 601, 605
(1972), cited in David Padilla, The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
of the Organization of American States: A Case Study, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 95, 96 n.4 (1993).
394. Approved by Resolution No. 447 taken by the General Assembly of the
OAS at it ninth regular session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, Oct. 1979.
395. See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 393, art. 18.
396. See id. art. 18(g).
397. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THI
AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 14 (3d ed. 1990).
398. The country reports and on-site investigations are one of the most success-
ful parts of the Inter-American system. Shelton notes that an on-site investigation in
El Salvador discovered torture chambers and disappeared persons, while a visit to
Panama succeeded in obtaining the repeal of an objectionable law affecting the
right to a fair trial. See Shelton, supra note 374, at 327. She goes on to note that in
Nicaragua:
The strength of the Commission report resulted in a resolution of the OAS calling for
the overthrow of the country's government. As characterized by the Commission, this
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recommendations for the promotion and protection of human rights,
serving as a consultative organ of the OAS on human rights matters,
and advising the Inter-American Court in both contentious cases and
advisory opinions.
40 0
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established in
1979.401 The Court is composed of seven part-time judges from OAS
member states who are elected for seven-year terms by states who are
parties to the American Convention.402 The court derives its authority
from the American Convention, the Statute of the Court, and the
Rules of Procedure.403 The Court has the authority to hear conten-
tious cases between states, or against one state at the request of the
Commission, regarding violations of the American Convention.
As with the International Court of Justice and the European Court,
however, states must accept the jurisdiction of the Court-either
generally or on a case-by-case basis-before it can hear a dispute.
40 5
Between 1979 and 1988, nine states accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the court; by 1995, seventeen of the twenty-five parties to
the American Convention had accepted it.
406
resolution, for the first time in OAS history. deprived an incumbent government of a
member state of legitimacy based on that government's human rights Vtolation, com-
mitted against its own population.
Id. Any OAS state may be the subject of a country report that may arise via indi-
vidual or inter-state petitions, via requests of the OAS General Assembly, via the
Commission's own motion, or at the request of the government involved. Nearly
half of the member states have been the object of country reports so far.
399. Both the Commission and the Court are authorized to take immediate
measures where there is immediate danger. This authority allows them to act with a
speed "unparalleled in other human rights institutions." Shelton, supra note 374, at
330. Shelton notes, for example, that it took the Commission three and a half weeks
to get a representative in Chile after the 1973 coup whereas it took the United Na-
tions five years. See id. Shelton also notes, however, that quick responses have
been more positive with respect to country studies than in individual cases. See hL
400. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 397, at 231 -33.
401. Seeid. at231.
402. See American Convention. supra note 4. art. 521l).
403. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 397, at 232.
404. See American Convention. supra note 4, arts. 61-64.
405. See id. art. 62.
406. The eight parties to the American Convention who have not accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court are Barbados. Brazil, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica. and Mexico.
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Besides its contentious jurisdiction, the Inter-American Court has
"the most extensive advisory jurisdiction of any international juridi-
cal body., 40 7 Advisory opinions can be requested by any OAS mem-
ber state or organ with respect to the interpretation of instruments
concerning the protection of human rights in the Americas. 40 8 Al-
though these instruments most commonly concern the American
Convention, the American Declaration, or the OAS Charter, the
Court has held that its powers extend to the interpretation of any in-
ternational human rights instrument if it directly relates to human
rights protection in a member state.40 9 States can also seek to test the
compatibility of their domestic law with Inter-American instru-
410ments. Advisory opinions are not binding, but as one scholar
comments, they carry considerable moral force, help focus interna-
tional attention on human rights violations, and defuse political ten-
sions. 4 11 The Court also has the authority to order provisional meas-
ures in cases of urgency. 412 The Inter-American Court is the only
system that authorizes such measures to be taken before the Court is
seized of the case.413
B. BENEFITS OF USING THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Although it is by no means a perfect system, the Inter-American
system attempts to correct many of the deficiencies of the other in-
ternational bodies. It does not rely solely on regular reports from
states' parties. Rather, similar to its counterpart in Europe, it is de-
signed specifically to investigate and decide alleged human rights
violations brought forward by individuals. The element of the Inter-
American system that has the greatest potential for improving human
rights is its rules concerning access by non-state actors. Shelton
comments that "[tihe provisions governing private access to the In-
407. Shelton, supra note 374, at 325.
408. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 64(1).
409. See Advisory Opinion No. OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, "Interpretation of the
Meaning of Other Treaties", in Article 63 of the American Convention, reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 51 (1983).
410. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 64(2).
411. See J. Lauchian Wash, et al., Conference Report: The Inter-American Hit-
man Rights System: Into the 1990s and Beyond, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 517,
528 (1988).
412. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 63(2).
413. See European Convention, supra note 372, sec. IV.
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ter-American system afford greater possibility in filing petitions than
in any other international human rights system and give the Commis-
sion great flexibility in implementing its procedures.'
,4 14
The Inter-American system is the first human rights system to al-
low individual petitions and remains the only system that makes in-
dividual petitions automatic and mandatory.415 By contrast, the Hu-
man Rights Committee and the European Commission on Human
Rights4 16 can only examine individual complaints if the state in
question has expressly accepted that body's competence to do so.
Perhaps even more compelling than the right of individuals to pe-
tition, is the right of any organization recognized in a member state
to bring a petition.417 This allows NGOs to bring petitions on behalf
of victims. This is absolutely crucial to an effective human rights
system in the Americas where extreme poverty, illiteracy, and politi-
cal violence prevent individuals from knowing and exercising their
rights. This is also crucial to the possibility of a child labor petition,
since victims of child labor or their representatives are unlikely to
have the resources or the desire to pursue their rights in a lengthy and
expensive international proceeding.
Another advantage of the Inter-American system is its two-tiered
structure. If the Commission's recommendations are not adopted, the
Commission can decide to refer the case on to the Inter-American
Court for a binding judgment, provided that the state in question has
414. Shelton, supra note 374, at 327.
415. In 1978, when the American Convention entered into force, military re-
gimes known for gross violations of human fights controlled much of Latin Amer-
ica. See Thomas Buergenthal, The OAS and the Protection of Rights, 3 EMORY J.
INT'L DISP. RESOL. 1, 23 (1988). Consequently, the development of the individual
complaint mechanism was hampered. See id. Originally, the need for domestic
remedies and the Commission's inability to force the government to respond also
hindered the individual complaint mechanism. See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HuM. RTs. Q. 439. 441 (1990). In addi-
tion, states were not likely to follow recommendations and Commission opinions
on individual cases that never reached the OAS. See id.
416. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 25(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 236-39, reprinted in
RICHARD B. LI..LICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATION.L HuMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT III (1995) (authorizing petitions against parties which
have acknowledged the competence of the Commission to review complaints).
417. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 44.
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ratified the American Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court. The Court issues binding decisions and may award compen-
sation to victims under Article 63 of the American Convention.
418
As with all international mechanisms, it is impossible to ensure
enforcement. Nonetheless, the potential to enforce decisions is
greater for a tribunal that hands down a binding judgment than for a
treaty body that merely expresses concern or makes suggestions for
change. This is particularly true since states have expressly accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court to hand down such judgments. As a re-
gional body, the decisions of the Inter-American Commission and the
Inter-American Court are also backed by a greater degree of consen-
sus than the ILO governing body, the Human Rights Committee, or
the ICJ. Because of this consensus, the opinions of the Inter-
American Court tend to be more liberal than those of the truly inter-
national bodies such as the ICJ. The Inter-American system also
contemplates applying international pressure on countries to encour-
age compliance with the Court's decisions by requiring the Court to
report noncompliance to the OAS General Assembly.419 In the past,
however, reports to the General Assembly have not had a significant
effect.
420
C. TAKING CHILD LABOR TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Taking the issue of child labor in Guatemala through the Inter-
American system would first require a petition to the Inter-American
Commission alleging a violation of a right or rights enunciated in the
American Convention or the American Declaration, the key human
rights instruments in the Inter-American arsenal.42'
By creating binding treaty obligations, the American Convention is
the most important of these instruments. Unfortunately, it is primar-
ily a document on civil and political rights. Article 26, the obligation
of progressive development, is the only right under the rubric of eco-
418. See id. art. 63.
419. See id. art. 65.
420. See Interview with Denise Gilman, Human Rights Specialist with the Inter-
American Commission (March 20, 1997) [hereinafter Gilman Interview].
421. Guatemala ratified the Convention in 1978 and accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court in 1987. See 5 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYsTEM 330, app. 2 at 11 (Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1993)
[hereinafter Buergenthal & Norris].
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nomic and social rights.422 Under this Article, states pledge only to
"adopt measures ... with a view to achieving progressively, by leg-
islation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights
implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural
standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American
States .... 42 While this may appear to limit the usefulness of the
American Convention in the realm of child labor, many of the provi-
sions under the heading of civil and political rights can be interpreted
to apply to the child labor problem in Guatemala.
Most importantly, Article 19 of the American Convention imposes
a positive obligation on the state to provide a minor with "the meas-
ures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of
his family, society, and the sta 424 Although this is obviously a
vague obligation, the measures of protection that a state must take
under Article 19 can be interpreted using the rights enumerated else-
where in the American Convention, as well as Guatemala's other in-
ternational obligations. The Commission often uses this approach.
For example, in a recent case on violence against street children in
Guatemala, other rights in the American Convention and in the
UNCRC were used to interpret the scope of Article 19. 4 - This is
consistent with Article 29 of the American Convention, which states
that no provision in the American Convention shall be interpreted as
"excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same
nature may have.'
4 26
Thus, in a child labor case, the prohibition against forced and
compulsory labor in Article 6(2) and the right to physical integrity in
Article 5 may be relevant. The Commission has recognized these
rights as appling to incidences of forced overtime in the niaquilas.
427
422. See American Convention, supra note 4. art. 26.
423. Id.
424. Id. art. 19.
425. See Case 11.383, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1997) (Los Bosques de San Nicolas.
This case is now before the Court. See Gilman Interview, supra note 420.
426. American Convention, supra note 4. art. 29.
427. The Commission has pointed out that forced overtime in the maquila in-
dustry violates Article 6. See Fourth Report, supra note 144. at 90. In its Country
Report on Chile, the Inter-American Commission further noted that "Article 5
should be read together with Article 6 of the American Convention, in order to cor-
rectly delimit the content of the right being examined: accordingly, forced labour
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Likewise, the right to life in Article 4 and the right to physical, men-
tal, and moral integrity in Article 5 applies where children are work-
ing in inherently dangerous occupations, particularly where children
are more likely to suffer injury or death due to their physical or men-
tal immaturity.428 Freedom of association in Article 16 may also be
relevant. Anyone old enough to work legally in Guatemala has the
right to join a trade union. In reality, the exercise of this right is se-
verely restricted. The rule also disenfranchises thousands of underage
workers who cannot join unions. Finally, Article 25 of the American
Convention guarantees judicial protection of an individual's rights.
429
The court system in Guatemala, as noted above, is unable or unwill-
ing to enforce the rights of individuals, including child laborers.
The scope of Guatemala's obligation to protect children in Article
19 can be further clarified by examining its commitments to children
under other international instruments. Guatemala is a party to the
Economic Covenant that provides the right to just and favorable con-
ditions of work including fair wages and the right to education.
430
Article 10(3) provides that:
Children and young persons should be protected from economic and so-
cial exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or
health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development
should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which
the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable
by law.43'
Guatemala has also ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on a mini-
mum age for employment. This Convention prohibits countries from
allowing children under the age of completion of primary schooling
to work and, in developing countries, children younger than fourteen
years of age cannot work. Finally, Guatemala ratified the UNCRC,
which provides for the right of children to be protected from eco-
nomic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be
hazardous, interfere with the child's education, or be harmful to the
may also be considered injurious to person integrity." 5 HuMAN RIGHTS: THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 59 (Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris, eds.,
1986).
428. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
429. See id. art. 25.
430. See Economic Covenant, supra note 319, arts. 7 & 13.
431. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(3).
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child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social devel-
432opment. This provision goes further than the Economic Covenant
since it requires states' parties to ensure the implementation of this
right, including, providing a minimum age of admission to employ-
ment, providing appropriate regulation of hours and conditions of
work, and providing appropriate penalties or other sanctions.
Article 19 of the American Convention should also be interpreted
bearing in mind the provisions of the American Declaration. Article
XI of the American Declaration provides every person with the right
to the preservation of health through sanitary and social measures.
Article XII states that every person has the right to an education that
will prepare him to attain a decent life, to raise his standard of living,
and to be a useful member of society.433 Finally, Article XIV pro-
vides that every person has the right to work, under proper condi-
tions, and that every working person has the right to receive remu-
neration in proportion to his capacity and skill in order to assure a
standard of living suitable for himself and for his family.
434
Relevant economic and social rights are laid out in detail in the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of
San Salvador"). 435 This instrument, however, has not yet come into
force.436 Nonetheless, Guatemala is a signatory, thereby indicating its
willingness to abide by its objects and purposes. 437 The Additional
Protocol contains detailed provisions on the right to work,438 the
right to just, equitable, and satisfactory conditions of work,439 and
432. See UNCRC, supra note 16, art. 32.
433. See American Declaration, supra note 5. art. XII.
434. See id. art. XIV.
435. O.A.S.T.S., No. 69, signed Nov. 17, 1988, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 4, at 677 [hereinafter PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR].
436. It currently has 10 of the necessary 11 ratifications.
437. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a
state is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty when the state has expressed consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the
treaty's entry into force, provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33 1.
438. See PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR, supra note 435, art. 6.
439. See id. art. 7.
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trade union rights.44° In particular, Article 7(f) of the Protocol pro-
vides that states' parties must guarantee in their legislation:
The prohibition of night work or unhealthy or dangerous working condi-
tions and, in general, of all work which jeopardizes health, safety, or mor-
als, for persons under 18 years of age. As regards minors under the age of
16, the work day shall be subordinated to the provisions regarding com-
pulsory education and in no case shall work constitute an impediment to
school attendance or a limitation on benefiting from education received. 441
The obligation to protect children under the American Convention
and the American Declaration "have not been subject to particularly
close scrutiny or analysis by the Commission or Court."442 In fact,
like most other rights, neither the Inter-American Commission nor
the Inter-American Court has ever addressed the issues of children's
rights and labor rights outside the context of individual cases of vio-
lence. Any petition on child labor, therefore, must present a strong
case to compensate for the novelty of the claim.
The best route is likely in the form of a small class action, whereby
an NGO brings forward several egregious examples of child labor
engaging several of the specific articles of the American Convention
mentioned above, as well as Article 19. For example, the class might
include a child worker injured in an agricultural accident, an under-
age maquila worker who was locked in the factory overnight on sev-
eral occasions, and children working in inherently dangerous occu-
pations such as mining and prostitution. The petition should present
cases of the youngest children working full-time in each sector since
child labor at a very young age is in itself considered to be a particu-
larly egregious form of child labor.
The procedure for such a petition is straightforward. The petition
must first meet certain technical requirements, including the identity
of the petitioner(s), the facts of the complaint, evidence of exhaustion
440. See id. art. 8.
441. Id. art. 7(f).
442. ScoTt DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 329
(1997). But see Case 11.383, Inter-Amer. C.H.R. (1997) (Los Bosques de San
Nicolas) (indicating that this standard may be changing).
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of domestic remedies, and an assurance that the incident is not before
any other international body.
443
In order to satisfy the exhaustion of domestic remedies prerequi-
site, these cases must first be taken before a Guatemalan tribunal.
The exhaustion threshold, however, has not been held to be an oner-
ous burden. In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Court held that only
those domestic remedies that are "'adequate" and capable of produc-
ing the desired result need be exhausted. 44" In an advisory opinion,
the Inter-American Court also held that the exhaustion threshold may
be met where the victim is too poor to obtain a lawyer and the state
does not provide legal aid, or where the victim cannot obtain legal
representation because of a general fear of violent reprisals for taking
the case.445 The failure of the Guatemalan courts to effectively deal
with the complaints would also raise concerns under Article 25 of the
American Convention as a ground for the complaint. 6
When a petition is deemed admissible, the Commission sends the
relevant information to the government involved. Under Article
48(l)(a), the government must provide information on the allegations
within a reasonable period.447 In the Regulations of the Commission,
the government must supply the requested information within ninety
days, but a state may request an extension of thirty days for justifi-
able cause as long as the time does not extend beyond one hundred
eighty days in total.448 If there is no response, or the response is in-
adequate, the Commission may deem the allegations in the petition to
be true." 9
443. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 46(1) (establishing the Com-
mission requirement for submitting petitions or communications).
444. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case. Judgment of June 26. 1987, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., app. IV-A, OEA/ser. L./V./III.17. doc.13 (Ser. C) No. 1 (1988). reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 321.
445. Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 4601. 46(21(a)
& 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Adv isory Opinion OC-
11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11. para. 2 (1990), re-
printed in 12 HUM. RTs. L.J. 20 (1991 ).
446. See American Convention. supra note 4. art. 25( 10(2) (providing the right
to competent judicial protection for violations of fundamental rights).
447. See American Convention. supra note 4, art. 48(11(a).
448. See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, arts.
34(5) & (6) (amended Mar. 7. 1985. June 29, 1987. Sept. 21. 1995, and April 29-
May 3, 1996).
449. See id. art. 42.
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If the Commission decides to proceed, it may hold a full hearing or
request the parties to provide additional written information. 450 The
Commission may also carry out an on-site visit to investigate the
case.45 1 Under the American Convention, the Commission must also
"place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to
reaching a friendly settlement. 4 52 If a friendly settlement is not
reached, the Commission draws up a report that is sent to the state
party in confidentiality.
453
Within three months of submitting this report, the affair may be
settled or the Commission may decide to send the case to the Court
for a binding judgment. If neither of these occur, the Commission
writes a second report containing the facts, its conclusions and rec-
ommendations, and a time limit for implementation. If the govern-
ment involved does not implement the recommendations within the
time frame determined by the Commission, the report may be pub-
lished in the Commission's Annual Report.454
The recommendations of the Commission do not have the force of
binding judgments. Their biggest impact lies in the threat of public-
ity. Additionally, the Annual Report of the Commission is addressed
by the OAS General Assembly, raising the theoretical possibility of
political pressure on non-complying states. It is the discretion of the
Commission, however, to refer cases to the Court for a binding
judgment that offers the real incentive for states to comply with the
Commission's recommendations.
The Commission is supposed to send controversial cases or cases
on matters of importance to the hemisphere to the Court.455 It is
questionable whether a child labor petition would meet these criteria.
The Court examines the case de novo and makes a judgment that is
final and binding. Under Article 63 of the American Convention, the
450. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 48(1)(e).
451. See id. arts. 48(d) & (e).
452. Id. art. 48(f).
453. See id. art. 50.
454. See id. art. 51.
455. See Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the
Practice of Journalism (art. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of 13 Nov. 1985, Inter-Am. Crt. H.R., ser. A: Judg-
ments and Opinions, No. 5, para. 26, OEA/Ser.J/VIII.12/doc.13 (1985) 19 at 42,
25 I.L.M. 123 (1986).
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Court is authorized to award remedies.456 The scope of the right to a
remedy is of considerable importance in the case of child labor and
will be discussed further in Part VI.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
As noted above, the structure of the Commission and the Court
have improved upon the models in the United Nations and in Europe
in several ways. Using the Inter-American system to pursue human
rights, however, is not a flawless method. Considerable obstacles to
the effective protection of human rights in the Inter-American system
remain.
Commentators have criticized the legal reasoning and the irregu-
larity of the procedural rules applied by the Commission.457 They
have also reproached the lack of publicity surrounding activities of
the Commission and the Court.458 Publicity is, of course, one of the
major reasons for taking a child labor petition forward in the first
place. Other criticism has focused on political problems, which al-
ways arise in a system designed as part of a political organization.
One observer commented that political considerations may be more
difficult to escape in the Inter-American Court with its seven judges
than in the European Court, which has thirty-two judges.459 Financial
difficulties also limit the effectiveness of both the Commission and
the Court.460 The Commission sits for only two sessions a year and
receives only 2% of the budget of the OAS.
Having a two-tiered system also creates lengthy delays. In the
Velasquez Rodriguez case, it took four and a half years from the pe-
tition until the case was referred to the COUrt 46 1 and another four years
until the judgment was rendered.462 Cases cannot be taken to the
456. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 63.
457. See Shelton, supra note 374, at 328, 332.
458. See id. at 334; Wash, supra note 411, at 562.
459. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Hunan Rights System: Estab-
lishing Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law. 26 U. MiAxi INTER-AM.
L. REV. 297, 360 (1994).
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court without first going through the Commission. Judge Rodolfo
Piza Escalante commented in his concurrence in the case In re Vivi-
ana Gallardo: "they hobbled [the court] by interposing the impedi-
ment of the Commission, by establishing a veritable obstacle course
that is almost insurmountable, on the long and arduous road that the
basic rights of the individual are forced to travel. 463
A central problem is that, unlike the Commission, individuals and
NGOs do not have standing to bring contentious cases before the
Court.46 4 Cases must arise between states, or the Commission must
send cases to the Court.465 Although some have advocated for a
change in this regard, resource restrictions, as well as the lesser de-
gree of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction compared to the Euro-
pean Court, 4 6 6 make this change unlikely in the near future. 467 This
means that the Commission has unlimited discretion to decide what
cases to refer to the Court. Due to the progressive nature of obliga-
tions to ensure economic rights and the arguably less serious nature
of child labor compared to political killings, the Commission may
not see the referral of a child labor petition as appropriate or neces-
sary.
B. HURDLES TO USING INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
While choosing to litigate child labor in an international forum
may be more effective than leaving the issue to diplomatic question-
ing under a United Nations treaty body, international litigation pres-
ents more general difficulties. These difficulties include the need to
prove state responsibility; the reticence of international law to hold
states accountable for economic, social, and cultural rights, and the
question of flexibility of remedies.
463. In re Viviana Gallardo, et al., Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion No. G. 101/81
(Nov. 13,1981), Inter-Am. H.R. (ser. A/B), OEA/ser./L/III.5, doc.13, reprinted in
20 I.L.M. 1424, 1434 (Piza Escalante, J., concurring).
464. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 61.
465. See id. arts. 48, 50.
466. Most notably, the failure of the United States to ratify the American Con-
vention has deprived the system of a significant degree of legitimacy needed to in-
crease the authority of the Court.
467. All of the states in the European Union have ratified the European Conven-
tion and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court.
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1. State ResponsibilitY
International law governs the behavior of states, not private indi-
viduals. The responsibility of the state must be addressed before
Guatemala can be held accountable for violations of the American
Convention or other international obligations relating to child labor.
In most cases, however, children who are exploited work for private
employers or even their own families.468
The Velasquez Rodriguez case, decided by the Inter-American
Court in 1988, held that states can be held responsible for the actions
of private individuals in some cases. 469 The Velasquez case involved
the responsibility of the state for the disappearance of Rodriguez at
the hands of one of the notorious Latin American death squads.470
The Court found that, even if the state was not directly involved in
the rights violation, responsibility could still arise from the state's re-
sponse or lack of response to a consistent pattern of gross human
rights violations. 471 The Court, in that case, was interpreting Article
1(1) of the American Convention, a key provision which puts a posi-
tive obligation on the state to respect and ensure the rights contained
in the Convention.472 The Court held that Article I(1) encompassed
three distinct obligations for the state: the obligation to refrain from
violating rights, the obligation to prevent the violation of rights, and
the obligation to investigate and punish violations which have oc-
curred.473 Although the Velasquez case arose in the context of a dis-
appearance at the hands of a Latin American death squad-a terrible
and frequent occurrence in Latin American countries during the
1970s-there is no principled reason why this interpretation of Arti-
cle 1(1) should not apply to all cases where human rights violations
occur consistently.
Thus, even if a state has not been guilty of directly using child la-
bor, it can still be held responsible for failing to prevent it and for
468. See supra parts II.B.4, II.B.6.
469. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., app. IV-A, OEA/ser. L./V./III.17, doc.13 (Ser. C), No. 1, para. 164 (1988,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 321.
470. See id. para. 3.
471. See id. para. 172.
472. See id. paras. 165-69.
473. See id. paras. 166-176.
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failing to investigate and punish those who are responsible. The lack
of response by the Guatemalan court system to labor rights and chil-
dren's rights, as noted by the Commission in its Fourth Report, as
well as the ineffectiveness of the labor inspectorate, make a failure to
investigate and punish fairly clear. The state's responsibility to pre-
vent child labor is less clear given the fact that several administrative
programs aimed at child labor have been adopted by the state. A
finding of responsibility for the failure to prevent child labor would
require the Commission to take a broad view of the causes. The state
should be held accountable for its unwillingness to seriously address
the socio-economic status of its peoples and the failure to enforce
both an adequate minimum wage as well as an effective education
system.
2. Litigating Economic and Social Rights
Until now, the Inter-American system has focused almost exclu-
sively on the egregious violations of civil and political rights com-
mitted under authoritarian regimes in Latin America. The Commis-
sion and the Court have examined the right to life and the right to
physical integrity. 474 The European Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee similarly have rarely delved into economic
rights. The exclusion of economic rights is partly a reflection of the
fact that civil and political rights have been separated from economic
and social rights under international law.475 This division is evident
in the existence of two International Covenants, one for civil and po-
litical rights and another for economic, social, and cultural rights. 6
It is also noticeable in the lack of explicit attention directed to eco-
nomic and social rights in the American Convention. According to
Chinkin and Wright, "One unfortunate consequence of the perceived
division of human rights law into these two areas has been a priority
accorded to civil and political rights to the detriment of economic
and social rights. 477
474. See Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap: Women, Food,
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The reason these two areas were initially separated was the lesser
degree of consensus on economic and social rights at the time. When
the International Covenants were being considered in 1950, Canada
expressed the common Western view that economic rights were so-
cial aims or advantages rather than human rights in the narrow
sense.478 That opinion is still common today. Economic, social, and
cultural rights are more frequently seen to be in the realm of exclu-
sive domestic jurisdiction rather than civil and political rights. De-
veloping states, in particular, charge that economic rights obligations
47~4would interfere with their right to develop their economies.
The Inter-American Commission has noted that economic policy is
"closely related to national sovereignty,"480 and has argued that states
must be given the right to choose how to allocate scarce resources.
41
In addition, the Commission has observed the difficulty of establish-
ing criteria to measure states' fulfillment of their obligations in this
area.
482
Monitoring the fulfillment of these obligations is difficult because
economic and social rights are usually stated as obligations of a pro-
gressive nature. For example, Article 1 of the Protocol of San Salva-
dor requires states to undertake to adopt measures "'to the extent al-
lowed by their available resources, and taking into account their
degree of development, for the purposes of achieving progressively
[the rights set out in the Protocol]." 483 Human rights systems are also
better designed for monitoring norms that require the state to refrain
from violating the rights of individuals. Economic and social rights,
478. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.297 (1950), quoted in Craig Scott, The Interde-
pendence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of
the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALl. L J. 769, 748
n.100 (1989).
479. See Chinkin & Wright, supra note 474, at 295-99 (descnbing the different
perspectives of Western States as opposed to the former Soviet Union in regard to
economic rights).
480. Annual Report 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.50. Doc.13. Rev.i (Oct 2,
1980), in 5 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 'ol. 24, at 30 t May




483. PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR, supra note 435. art. 1.
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however, often create positive obligations on the state to ensure col-
lective rights.
In recent years, however, an increasing amount of attention has
been paid to the importance of economic and social rights, including
child labor. This reflects the popular modem view that the achieve-
ment of civil and political rights is, in fact, closely tied to respect for
economic and social rights.484 As Chinkin and Wright explain: "It is
not clear that freedom of any kind can exist where the basic necessi-
ties of life enslave human beings to a subsistence level of existence
,485or to ill-health and death through malnutrition.
The Commission has stated the importance of economic and social
rights to the maintenance of peace and stability on a number of occa-
sions.486 For example, in its Annual Report for 1979-1980 the Com-
mission noted that "neglect of economic and social rights, especially
when political participation has been suppressed, produces the kind
of social polarization that then leads to acts of terrorism by and
against the government .... 487 In its Fourth Report, the Commis-
sion noted:
In such circumstances [of poverty and poor income distribution], exercise
of freedom of association for economic and labour purposes is crucial.
Obstacles to the exercise of that right are not only a violation of it, but
also invariably lead to violent social friction and violations of the rights to
life and to humane treatment .... The necessity to reform and reinforce
the action of the labor sector of the Judiciary is indispensable to avoid the
possibility that labor tensions explode into conflicts beyond the judicial
process. Neither peace, nor productive investment and growth, nor social
development are possible without them.488
The increasing concern about economic and social rights is re-
flected at many levels. Within the United Nations, the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is now considering the adop-
tion of an Optional Protocol to give individuals a right of petition
484. See Chinkin & Wright, supra note 474, at 295 (noting that "[ilt may just as
well be argued that political freedom is a luxury that can only be afforded by those
who are not fully occupied with attempting to ensure that they and their children
will eat today and tomorrow").
485. Id.
486. See id.
487. Annual Report for 1979-80, supra note 480, at 30.
488. Fourth Report, supra note 144, at 88, 91.
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similar to that which exists under the Civil and Political Covenant.
Although an attempt to have labor rights linked to a multilateral
trading system have been unsuccessful so far, the ILO is now ex-
ploring the link between trade and labor rights.48"'
Within the Inter-American system, the Additional Protocol on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights will likely enter into force
shortly because it needs only one more ratification. Consequently,
both the Commission and the Court will soon be forced to consider
economic and social rights in the context of individual cases. The
American Declaration and, to a more limited extent, the American
Convention already contain rights that can be interpreted to be of an
economic, social, or cultural nature.490 This interpretation is sup-
ported by one of the clauses of the preamble to the American Con-
vention that reads: "Reiterating that. in accordance with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free men enjoying
freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cul-
tural rights, as well as his civil and political rights .... ." The Los
Bosques case491 on Guatemalan street children, which directly ad-
dresses Article 19 of the American Convention. may be an indication
that the Inter-American system is already beginning to address the
overlap between civil and political rights, and economic and social
rights in individual cases.
The comments of the European Court in the Airev case are also
relevant. 492 While it must be recognized that the realization of eco-
nomic and social rights largely depends on a state's situation-par-
ticularly a state's financial situation-the rights enumerated in inter-
national human rights treaties must be interpreted so they are more
effective. Thus, an interpretation that "might extend into the sphere
of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against
such an interpretation., 493 The stage is thus set for the Inter-
American Commission and Court to directly consider economic and
489. See International Labour Organization. The Social Dimcnsion of the Liber-
alization of hzternational Trade (visited Jan. 25. 1998) <http://"' w '.ilo.org/public/
english/6Oempfor/cdart/prog3.htm>.
490. See American Convention, supra note 4. at preamble.
491. Case 11.383, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1997) (Los Bosques de San Nicolas).
492. See Airey v. Ireland. 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). at para. 5 (1979%.
493. Id.
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social rights, such as child labor. The key to the system's effective-
ness in this area will lie in its approach to remedies.
3. Remedies
"It is a principle of international law, which jurisprudence has con-
sidered 'even a general concept of law,' that every violation of an
international obligation that results in harm creates a duty to make
adequate reparation., 494 In the American Convention, this principle
is codified in Article 63 (1), which states:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be
ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall
also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that
fair compensation be paid to the injured party.
495
Broadening the scope of the Inter-American system to deal with
economic, social, and cultural rights such as child labor will require
an expanded view on how this right to a remedy should be inter-
preted.
All of the cases before the court thus far have involved actual or
presumed loss of life for which reparation must be in the form of
496monetary compensation. In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the wife
sought, in addition to pecuniary compensation, several other reme-
dies.497 These additional measures included: an end to the forced dis-
appearances, an investigation into other similar cases, a complete and
truthful public report on what happened, a public act to honour the
disappeared, and guarantees to respect the work of humanitarian and
family organizations.
498
The Court stated that the right to a remedy in international law was
based on the principle of restitutio in integrum, which requires resto-
ration of the prior situation, reparation of the consequences of the
494. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages (art. 63(l) American
Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C: no. 7. para. 25 (1989).
495. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 63(1).
496. See Dinah Shelton. The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Hit-
man Rights, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 333, 363 (1994).
497. See Velasquez Rodriguez para.7.
498. See Mendez & Vivanco, supra note 383, at 363.
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breach, and indemnification for damages, including emotional
harm.499 While this sounds like a far-reaching holding, in fact, the
Court agreed only on the award of compensatory damages to the di-
rect relatives of the victim. 50 0 The Court noted that the requirements
to investigate the crime and punish the perpetrators were already
Honduras's obligations under the Court's judgment on the merits. 50'
As for the other requests, the Court noted only that the judgment on
the merits was itself a type of reparation or moral satisfaction for the
victims.
This narrow interpretation of Article 63 appears to restrict the In-
ter-American Court to ordering only monetary compensation. If a
child labor petition is to be effective, however, more broad-based,
non-individual remedies are needed. As the discussion in Part I dem-
onstrated, the problem of child labor is not a question of individual
rights but a systemic problem with many causes that require many
different solutions. Thus, awarding "compensation" to a victim is
unlikely to be effective or even possible. Paying child victims nomi-
nal damages for their physical injuries would be pointless because
the vast majority of harm caused by child labor is not directly visible.
In fact, many of the petitioners in a child labor case may have no ob-
vious physical injuries from working. Apart from direct physical
harm, however, the "injury" experienced by a working child is im-
possible to calculate. How can the opportunity cost of foregone edu-
cation be calculated? What price can be put on the consequences of
low education for the entire population? Even if the injury could be
calculated, how much of this cost should be attributed to the state
given that cultural factors, personal preferences, and the position of
developing states in the international economy are also responsible
for child labor?
Merely requiring the government to enforce legislation on child
labor cannot solve the problem either. In fact, it may make a bad
situation worse since children would be forced to find work in the in-
formal economy to survive. As noted above, by making their eco-
499. See Shelton, supra note 496, at 362-63.
500. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages (art. 63(1) Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
ser. C: no. 7, para. 192.
501. See id. para. 188.
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nomic role illegal, children become even more difficult to protect
from exploitation. Moreover, addressing child labor concerns on an
individual basis would reach only the few complainants whose sto-
ries are brought forward. Even if the victims could be adequately
compensated, the restitution would do nothing to change the under-
lying problems that contribute to child labor for thousands of others.
Such a conclusion would be contrary to the point of bringing such a
petition forward in the first place.
Even if broad remedies were available, it would be difficult to de-
termine an appropriate remedy in a child labor petition because it
goes to the heart of the disagreement over what causes child labor
and how it can be best eliminated. An appropriate remedy, however,
would necessarily require a whole range of approaches. For example,
the Court should order the government to improve its enforcement of
domestic labor laws and its health and safety regulations. It should
also order the government to allow underage workers to join unions
if they desire. More importantly, the government should be required
to increase the proportion of its budget spent on education and other
social programs to at least the median of other countries in the re-
gion. A reasonable timetable for the increase of the adult minimum
wage to a level consistent with the amount required to meet basic
needs, as well as other plans for addressing the inequitable distribu-
tion of wealth and the extreme poverty faced by the country, should
be required. A flexible remedy certainly would need to combine both
orders and prescriptions for progressive change to reflect the nature
of the rights at issue. Thus, freedom from violence and the right to
organize should be recognized as core rights that cannot be derogated
from, while other remedies, such as poverty alleviation, must leave
the state with some margin to implement remedies as it chooses.
Despite the decision in Velasquez to limit reparations to monetary
compensation, the right to such a broad remedy is not inconsistent
with the American Convention. Note that Article 63 provides that the
Court, on finding a violation "shall rule that the injured party be en-
sured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated [and
shall rule] if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or
situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be
remedied ....,502 Thus, the Court could use such broad remedies if
502. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 63.
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it determined that they were necessary to ensure the enjoyment of the
right by the injured party or as a way of remedying the consequences
of the situation that caused the breach.
In fact, in a later decision, the Court showed some willingness to
expand the concept of remedies. In the Aloeboetoe case, the remedy
awarded included an amount to enable the minor children of the vic-
tims to continue their education. 503 Because the victims were from a
small native village, the effective enjoyment of this remedy required
the Court to order the government to reopen the village school and
staff it. The Court also ordered the reopening of the medical dispen-
sary in the village.5°4 "These are clearly far-reaching orders made by
the Court and seem to confirm the opinion that it is competent to re-
quire not only rectification of the circumstances which gave rise to
any breach but also to order specific performance of non-pecuniary
forms of satisfaction."
505
This judgment, however, still required that the damages not be too
remote. Furthermore, the Court rejected the Commission's argument
that compensation go to the tribe as a whole rather than to just the
close relatives of the victims. Both of these requirements could prove
problematic in a child labor case. Thus, while there appears to be
some movement by the Court to recognize broader, non-
compensatory forms of reparation, it is far from certain whether this
trend would continue in a child labor petition. Certainly, the ability
of the Inter-American Court to order such remedies is pivotal to the
usefulness of the system as a tool to fight child labor.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although relatively little research has been done to document the
problem, child labor is present in virtually all areas of the Guatema-
lan economy. Moreover, despite domestic legislation prohibiting
child labor and several programs announced by the state to help
eliminate it, the number of underage child workers in Guatemala
continues to grow. Although child labor is clearly not an easy prob-
lem to solve, at least part of the problem can be attributed to the fail-
503. See Aloeboetoe, et al. Case, Reparations (art. 631) American Convention
on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C.. No. 15 (1993).
504. See Shelton, supra note 496. at 370.
505. DAVIDSON, supra note 442, at 225.
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ure of the Guatemalan state to adequately protect children as it is
obliged to do under its international commitments. Such obligations
include protection from economic exploitation and provision of ade-
quate educational opportunities.
Pressuring the Guatemalan state to adequately address the problem
of child labor is best done by taking the issue to an international fo-
rum. Specifically, the most effective route for gaining publicity for
the child labor issue and pressuring the state to respond is by taking a
petition on child labor to the Inter-American Commission. Although
child labor is a novel complaint for the Inter-American system-in-
deed economic rights in general are novel issues for international
litigation-the American Convention and Guatemala's other interna-
tional obligations contain the provisions necessary to hold Guatemala
responsible for failing to protect its children from exploitative labor
conditions.
Furthermore, there is a possibility that any such child labor peti-
tion could be referred to the Inter-American Court. A referral would
provide an excellent opportunity for an international tribunal to make
an in-depth consideration of economic rights in general and child la-
bor in particular. A child labor petition would also provide an op-
portunity for the Court to expand its concept of remedies under Arti-
cle 63 of the American Convention to allow broad-based, non-
individualized, and flexible remedies. An expanded concept of reme-
dies is necessary for the Inter-American system or other international
tribunals to be able to effectively deal with economic and social
rights.
Despite the problems inherent in the Inter-American system, its
potential for promoting human rights is significant. More impor-
tantly, this potential is only beginning to be realized. A greater de-
mand for hearings at the Commission and a rising caseload at the
Court reflect the increasing sophistication of the system's users, the
greater openness of member states with the return of democracy to
Latin America, the increasing number of parties to the American
Convention, and the increasing number of these parties which have
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
°6
506. See Padilla, supra note 393, at 101.
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The importance of economic rights has already been recognized by
the Commission in several of its reports and will undoubtedly be-
come more central once the Additional Protocol on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights comes into force. The issue of child labor
presents the perfect opportunity for the Commission, and possibly the
Court, to begin to consider the scope of these rights. Consideration of
child labor by the Inter-American system would also open up inter-
national litigation as a another potential weapon available to fight the
complex problem of child labor.
